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ABSTRACT 
AT ARM'S LENGTH?: COMMERCIAL RESEARCH AGENDAS, 
ACADEMIC SCIENCE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL BOUNDARIES 
May 1992 
JOHN MICHAEL CAVANAUGH, B.A., ST. FRANCIS COLLEGE 
B.S., BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE 
M.S., GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 
M.B.A., RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor D. Anthony Butterfield 
Concepts of organizational boundary have played a long and 
integral role configuring the intellectual landscape of organizational 
theory. By and large, organizational-environmental frontiers are simply 
assumed to be there. The interpenetrated condition of contemporary 
organizations and environments, however, bids us to question theorizing 
which treats organizations and environments as ontologically distinct 
entities. 
In particular, a new generation of research alliances between a 
host of American research universities and multi-national corporations 
has provoked debate over the boundaries demarking university and 
industrial interests. Some (Traditionalists) fear that the separation 
between academic and commercial practices is breaking down, particularly 
as the commercial potential and shrinking developmental timeframes in 
some laboratory-driven fields place a premium on market-oriented 
research, entrepreneurship and exclusive claims to information 
ownership. Others (Instrumentalists) counter that the academy needs to 
v 
update its internal system of values and priorities if universities are 
to effectively meet the needs of a contemporary knowledge-based society. 
Accordingly, this exploratory study attempts to address the 
substantivity of organizational boundary by examining how those who 
presumably construct frontiers - in this case select groups of 
university faculty - define the normative boundaries of their academic 
work. Using the oppositional modes characterizing the Traditionalist/ 
Instrumentalist discourse as conceptual brick and mortar, faculty were 
invited to construct the social relationships of their professional 
work. Thirty-one (31) faculty members Q sorted 66 issue statements in a 
study designed to give numerical form to their normative boundaries, in 
order to test (1) the ontological status of organizational boundaries 
and (2) the claims of the Traditionalist-Instrumentalist antithesis. 
The indeterminacy of borders empirically elaborated in this study 
opens the literature's core territorial assumptions to interpretation. 
If, in other words, the "thingness" (Weick, 1977) of borders can no 
longer be sustained unproblematically, how is the Archimedian point of 
the management science universe - the single-minded, factual 
"organization" - to be located? Without firm boundaries, "insides" and 
"outsides" are no longer knowable. The ambiguity surrounding "the 
university's" location prompts a reconsideration of interpretive grammar 
that promotes organizations as sovereign and unified "centre(s) of 
calculation and classification" (Clegg, 1990). 
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The first problem in understanding an organization or a social 
system, is its location and identification. How do we know that we are 
dealing with an organization? What are its boundaries? What behavior 
belongs to the organization, and what behavior lies outside of it? 
Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn (1966) 
However, this possibility they regard to be a methodological 
fiction because, in the face of a multiplicity of occupational world 
images, any conception of "society as an autonomous, self-enclosed 
system with clear-cut boundaries" is obtainable only by a form of verbal 
magic. 
Joseph Bensman and Robert Lilienfeld (1991) 
vii 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CHANGED CONTEXT OF ACADEMIC RESEARCH 
Many factors have been involved in the academy's courtship of 
industry, but one factor seems overriding. For the first time in basic 
biomedical research, the university has something extremely valuable to 
sell. 
Culliton (1981) 
Introduction 
Concepts of organizational boundary have played a long and 
integral role configuring the intellectual landscape of organizational 
theory. By and large, organizational-environmental frontiers are simply 
assumed to be there. The interpenetrated condition of contemporary 
organizations and environments, however, bids us to question theorizing 
which treats organizations and environments as ontologically distinct 
entities (George and Campbell, 1990). 
Accordingly, this exploratory study attempts to address the issue 
of the substantivity of organizational boundary by examining how those 
who presumably construct frontiers - in this case select groups of 
university faculty - define the normative boundaries of their academic 
work.1 Using the oppositional modes characterizing what we have 
designated here as the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist discourse as 
conceptual brick and mortar, faculty were invited to construct their own 
cartographies regarding the social organization of their professional 
relationships. Our findings provide a mathematical visualization of 
empirical boundaries at work. These constitute the basis for some 
critical questions about the ontological status of organizational 
1 
boundaries and the fundamental organization/environment dualism that 
boundaries configure. 
This document is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 sets the 
stage with a brief review of the changing context of university/industry 
relations and the debate that has ensued over the alleged reconstruction 
of research universities along the lines of the large business 
enterprise. Chapter 2 offers a cartographic analysis of the 
organizational literature. The indicative boundaries or geometry of 
seminal theories of organization are used to construct a concentric 
model of organizational theory. In conformance with the interpretive 
approach adopted here, Chapter 3 grounds the current debate over the 
materiality of university boundaries in an interpretive history of 
university/industry relations. Chapter 4 explains the operation of Q 
Methodology and its significance to this study in preserving the opinion 
of our faculty sample. In Chapter 5, findings are organized and 
interpreted using an array of visual displays. The conceptual 
implications of these findings and interpretations are presented in the 
final chapter (6) along with suggestions for future work. 
Background 
University, industry and government relations turned another 
corner in the early 1970s. Universities increasingly looked to industry 
to fill the gap created by the overall stabilization of (and in some 
cases deep cuts in) federal research and development (R & D) funds 
imposed by the Nixon administration (NSB, 1982). For example, federal 
support in 1972 dollars for academic R & D grew at an annual rate of 12% 
between 1953 and 1960, 14% from 1960 to 1968, and 0% between 1968 and 
1974 (Rosenzweig, 1982: 17). At the same time, both government and 
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industry enlisted the university to help unlock the riddle posed by 
America's purported "innovation gap" (Reich, 1989; Lyon, 1982). Given 
the national mandate to replace an aging industrial base with globally 
competitive laboratory-driven technologies, university research was 
reconstituted as a critical economic resource inextricably tied to 
national power (Kenny, 1988). With active government involvement, these 
priorities have inspired an array of novel contractual arrangements 
between select research universities and a handful of giant 
multinational corporations to commercialize the fruits of academic 
research. 
The numbers reflect industry's expanding role. Although 
government continues to underwrite the bulk of basic campus research 
(not to mention 33% of all in-house industrial R & D in 1985 [Blits, 
1985]) industry's absolute and relative importance continues to expand. 
For instance, industrial support of university research doubled in 
constant dollars from 1966 to 1978 (Stankiewicz, 1986). Indeed, 
industry's share of total academic R & D funding climbed from 3% in the 
late 1970s to roughly $750 million or one-tenth (10%) of the federal 
research contribution in 1988 (Stankiewicz, 1986; Powers, et al., 1988; 
Fuchsberg, 1989).2 In the three years between 1981 and 1984 industry 
support increased by 8.5% per year (NSB, 1982). In 1987-88 a milestone 
of sorts was achieved with 51% of all industry support going to public 
institutions (particularly Ph.D.-granting research schools), up from 
13.8% of total industry donations in 1956-57 (McMillen, 1989). In 
1987-88 corporations contributed 22.6% of all voluntary support for 
higher education - an 82% increase from 1982-83 (Chronicle of Higher 
Education Almanac. Sept. 6, 1989). 
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This trend has been attributed to several key environmental and 
institutional factors including: decisions by university officials to 
aggressively seek out business patronage to offset the disruptive impact 
of volatile federal funding cycles (Rosenzweig, 1982; NSF, 1982); the 
enactment of a range of statutes clearing the way for commercializing 
university research (Dickson, 1984; Reams, 1986; Kenny, 1988); the 
climate of crisis symbolized by America's yawning trade deficits, 
declining productivity, and the eclipse of long-standing modes of 
manufacturing (Dickson, 1984); the rise of new information-driven 
technologies and the spread of science-based industry (OECD, 1984); and, 
not least, the shrinking gap between university discovery, on the one 
hand, and product development, on the other (Kenny, 1988; Lynton, 1987). 
A series of legislative enactments and juridical opinions provided 
a major impetus for the commercialization of academic research. In 
1980, Congress passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act 
(Public Law 96-480) opening the way for university-based industrial- 
technology centers (Nelkin, 1984). Shortly thereafter, the passage of 
the landmark Patent and Trademark Amendments of 1980 (Public Law 96- 
517) liberalized patent law by awarding universities the right to retain 
title to publicly funded research discoveries. Coverage under this act 
was subsequently broadened and additional licensing restrictions were 
removed in 1984 under Public Law 98-620. Even if wholly supported by 
public monies, henceforth, university research was to be treated as 
private property. Granted the right to sell "exclusive licenses on all 
discoveries made under a company's sponsorship," the university became a 
magnet for foreign and U.S. investment (Bourke, 1989, p. 495). The 
effects of this deregulatory legislation were felt almost immediately. 
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"University administrators surveyed by the GAO (Government Accounting 
Office) indicated that Public Law 96-517 had been important in 
stimulating business sponsorship of university research, which grew 74 
percent, from $277 million in 1980 to $482 million in 1985" (Kenny, 
1988, p. 23). Significantly, the courts have chosen to interpret this 
legislation to the letter, not hesitating to hand down heavy fines for 
patent infringements (Kenny, 1988). 
Along other fronts, tax laws were amended in 1981 to augment 
industry/university information transfers. Specifically, the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act (Public Law 97-34) enabled corporations to earn tax 
credits for research and development through 1986. P.L. 97-34 was 
extended for an additional three years under the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 
Legislatures and enforcement agencies have also turned a blind eye 
toward the problematic anti-trust issues arising from collaborative 
industrial and academic research ventures (Dickson, 1984; Kenny, 1988; 
see the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust Guide Concerning Research 
Joint Ventures. 1980). Recently, the National Institutes of Health, the 
nation's principle source of funding for biomedical research, announced 
that it was abandoning proposed conflict-of-interest guidelines 
(Gladwell, 1989). 
This deregulatory thrust is not predicted to change course anytime 
soon. For one, the university's fiscal problems continue to mount in 
the face of declining state budgets and unfavorable demographic trends 
(a shrinking middle class and student-age cohort [Footlick, 1990]). By 
the same token, as American managers continue to borrow extravagant sums 
of money to retool factories or consolidate corporate empires, 
proportionately less capital is available for in-house research activity 
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(Markoff, 1990). The overriding financial rationale, in other words, 
remains intact. Hat in hand, universities add corporate patrons, 
while campus research offers industry the most expedient means for 
socializing risky research costs (Dickson, 1984). 
The next section and following chapter (2) are meant to orient the 
reader to the characteristic perspectives of organizational boundary 
rendered in the Traditionalist, Instrumentalist, and Management 
literatures. These discussions supply the basic conceptual material for 
the comparative analysis of boundary presented in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The Debate: The University - An Economic or Non-Economic Institution? 
The past two decades have witnessed the advent of a new commercial 
compact between big business and the cream of American research 
universities. Increasingly, traditional philanthropic arrangements are 
being replaced by a preference for multi-year business partnerships and 
consortia often involving tens of millions of dollars. For the host of 
reasons specified earlier, university administrators and faculty find 
themselves under mounting pressure to commodify the fruits of research 
(Schaffer, 1980). The reputed emphasis on the entrepreneurization of 
the research process along with the marketization and privatization of 
research discovery has rekindled debate over the purpose and conduct of 
the university's intellectual culture. 
Proponents for the "greater instrumentalism" of university 
research agendas and processes, for example, view research institutions 
as an underutilized national resource. Lynton and Elman (1987) are 
representative when they write that, 
The existing, narrowly defined mold into which almost all 
universities have tried to cast themselves is not adequate to 
the expanding needs of our contemporary, knowledge-based 
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society. A large number of institutions are failing to 
realize their full potential because their internal system of 
values, priorities, and aspirations primarily emphasizes and 
rewards traditional modes of teaching for which the clientele 
is shrinking and basic research for which most of these 
institutions cannot receive adequate support (12). 
Historical and logical necessity, it is argued, have created an 
imperative need to do for industry what the land-grant system 
accomplished for American agriculture.3 New commercial breakthroughs, 
particularly in fast-breaking sciences like microelectronics and 
biotechnology, have obscured the line separating basic and developmental 
research activity. Ready or not, the ascendancy of science-driven 
technologies has ushered in a new interdisciplinary era necessitating a 
pragmatic reworking of industry/university boundaries. 
Perhaps most importantly, the reputed reduction in the time 
required to develop new product applications in some fields has involved 
capital in virtually every phase of the university's discovery process. 
Dorothy Nelkin (1984) observes that, 
In the past, commercial interests looked primarily to the 
goods and services produced through applied research; today, 
more fundamental knowledge is also recognized as having 
intrinsic value (2). 
These developments overturn the popular idea of the university campus as 
a world apart. In sum, the "Instrumental" school avows, the vestigial 
cultural remnants of the 19th Century university must not be allowed to 
cramp the contemporary campus's (and the nation's) march toward 
modernization. Times have changed. Economic and military 
reconstruction sanctions the invention of more fluid institutional 
arrangements between industry, the university and the state to market 
the technology emerging from university laboratory discovery. 
7 
But a handful of less sanguine observers insist on examining the 
fine print. Suspecting a variant of Gresham's Law at work, they foresee 
the day when market-oriented behavior drives out the academy's 
collective operating norms. That is, the "Traditionalist" fears that as 
more academics adopt an entrepreneurial model of success, the deepening 
business/university interface that results will produce unintended and 
undesirable institutional consequences for the university and society at 
large (Noble & Pfund, 1980; Schaffer, 1980; Nelkin, 1984; Dickson, 1984; 
Rule, 1988; Werth, 1988).4 
These concerns appear to derive from the assumption that the 
university and industry are each grounded in two essentially 
antithetical hierarchies of values: one (industry) based on a market 
exchange ethic where competition, private ownership and secrecy are the 
norm; the other (the university) on a property-less ethos where 
information (and the research and teaching function) is validated 
through determinations of social utility and the act of sharing 
(Gouldner, 1970; Price, 1986). Are policies intended to facilitate 
business and university collaboration, Traditionalists ask, in fact 
undermining the very existence of the university as a cooperative 
institution of liberal learning? These contradictory tendencies, they 
feel, need to be acknowledged and openly explored. 
In sum, that the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist discourse exists 
suggests that established norms and patterns of work peculiar to the 
academic community in the United States have undergone substantive 
modification as universities have moved from an adjunct role as 
providers of scientific knowledge and personnel to the intersection of 
national economic development (Smith, 1974; Etzkowitz, 1989). The 
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upshot appears to be that the traditional divisions of labor 
differentiating the ethos of science and commerce, although never air¬ 
tight, are today more obscured than ever before. The entrepreneurial 
inclinations of a growing number of leading academic scientists and 
university administrators make it increasingly difficult to obtain an 
accurate fix on where the university begins and industry ends. Business 
and government have become so deeply entrenched in some specialized 
areas of academic research that conventional definitions of 
organizational integrity based on precise delineations between "inside" 
and "outside" (and public and private) no longer seem to apply. All of 
this has culminated in a new awareness of boundary. 
The controversy surrounding the University of Utah's cold-fusion 
experiments in the Spring of 1989 may serve to illustrate the point 
(McDonald, 1989; Blakeslee, 1989; Fuchsberg, 1989). The question asked 
by many scientists at the time was, did the management of the Pons- 
Fleischmann cold-fusion experiment represent a normative aberration or a 
symptom of larger institutional changes? On one level - that of craft - 
the issue was one of methodological competence. Did the research adhere 
to the established pragmatics of chemistry? Was, for example, the heavy 
water used to bathe the experiment evenly mixed? Were instruments 
calibrated correctly? On another level - the institutional - the foot- 
dragging release of vital experimental details frustrated the peer 
review process thus inviting widespread doubts (even ridicule) over the 
integrity of the scientists themselves (McDonald, 1989; Raymond, 1989; 
Noble, 1989; Browne, 1989). Apparently eager to establish a claim for 
intellectual priority and ownership, but at the same time keenly aware 
of the lucrative prospects for commercializing the results of their 
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work, did Drs. Pons and Fleischmann (egged on by university officials) 
behave more like scientists or businessmen? 
The same kind of question is being asked about elite research 
universities as a class (Noble & Pfund, 1980; Nelkin, 1984; Dickson, 
1984; Krimsky, 1987). What "business" are universities in? The 
powerful mutual attraction drawing university officials, leading 
scientists, and representatives of industry together, and the tacit 
redrawing of institutional borders that this allegedly entails, not only 
strains the integrity of organizational frontiers but the literature's 
foundational analytic categories as well (Etzkowitz, 1989).5 In other 
words, the documented intimacy of universities and industry presents a 
special opportunity to reevaluate the adequacy of the unquestioned 
ontological status of organizational boundary, organizations, and 
environments shaping the literature's intellectual landscape. 
Endnotes 
1. "Substantivity" is Stewart Clegg's (1990) term. Clegg uses it to 
describe realist conceptions of organization bounded by fixed, 
material frontiers. Likewise, substantivity is used here to 
denote objectively discernible "thingness." 
2. These figures actually understate industry's role because its 
support flows through a variety of direct and indirect channels, 
i.e., grants, private donations, foundations, hiring faculty, etc. 
(Zinberg, 1985), clearing the way for commercializing university 
research. 
3. "The extension of public support for many sciences in the 
nineteenth century was premised upon their capacity to reduce 
uncertainty in key areas, such as agriculture" (Whitley, 1984: 
140). 
4. For example, after signing a ten-year, $23 million pact with the 
Monsanto Corporation in 1974, Harvard "...discarded its 
traditional patent policy that 'no patents primarily concerned 
with therapeutics or public health may be taken out...except for 
dedication to the public'" (Reams, 1986: 105). In addition, 
"During the almost two-year period of negotiations between the 
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parties, the standard practice of peer review through faculty 
committees and public comment was avoided" (Reams, 1986: 105). 
Such flexibility is not unusual in the current climate of 
university/industry relations (see Dickson, 1984; Reams, 1986). 
5. Henry Etzkowitz (1989) writes that incentives for change arise 
from two sources. "Shifts in federal funding patterns for 
academic research and federal policy changes regarding the 
ownership of intellectual property define the external context for 
these changes. The internal context is found in administrative 
and faculty reactions to these changes and to entrepreneurial 
activities at similar institutions" (15). For more historical 
detail, consult Chapter 3. 
11 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the absence of distinguishable boundaries, there can be no 
organizations as we understand the term. 
Scott, 1987 
Introduction 
The ambiguity produced by the simultaneous forward integration of 
university science into the marketplace and deep backward integration of 
capital into the academic discovery process poses a dilemma for any 
theoretical system that treats organizations and environments as 
distinct entities, because it confounds the objective ontological status 
of organizational boundaries. In large part the materiality of 
organizational boundary underwriting the organization/environment 
duality parallels the theoretical metamorphosis of organizational 
constructs in the literature. That is, hand in hand with more 
contingent imagery of "organization," concepts of boundary have evolved 
from fixed concrete entities to something more provisional and 
processual. Still, however boundary is conceptualized or problematized, 
its critical bracketing function of differentiating organizations from 
environments continues to unify the literature. 
A theoretical emphasis on boundary, then, makes it possible to 
analyze the literature's major contributors and schools according to the 
lines peculiar to each. Indeed, as this chapter will attempt to show, 
the degree of "facticity" that various theorists inject into 
"organizational boundaries" reveals much about the evolution of 
organizational theory's ontological presuppositions concerning 
12 
institutional order and change (Hall, 1981). For convenience, the essay 
below adheres to Scott's (1987) paradigmatic classification of the 
theoretical literature into rationalistic, natural, and open systems. 
The Rational Prototype 
Thick, bold lines drawn at military angles are the hallmark of 
goal-driven, rationalistic models of organization (Gulick & Urwick, 
1937; Mooney & Riley, 1939; Fayol, 1949; Frederick Taylor, 1911; Max 
Weber, 1946). The expeditious achievement of managerial objectives 
(functional rationality) dictated that structural boundaries be made 
mathematically explicit and visible (Scott, 1987). Fixed boundaries in 
the guise of formalized roles, procedures and rules underwrote 
management's master plan, insured workplace compliance, and isolated the 
organization's core rationality from potentially destabilizing extra- 
organizational forces. 
Certainty was encapsulated within a jurisdictional vocabulary - 
functionalization, specialization, standardization, and specification - 
delineating a highly formalized set of interdependent functional 
relationships. The early Classical Management theorists (Taylor, 1911; 
Gulick 6c Urwick, 1937; Mooney 6c Riley, 1939; Fayol, 1949), for example, 
constructed their clockwork model of organization around an unquestioned 
adherence to designated chains and spans of control. Frederick Taylor's 
(1911) "scientific" formula to standardize work specified the longitude 
and latitude of formal organization - the division and coordination of 
labor. And Weber's (1946) ideal of rational-legal authority entailed a 
juridical hierarchy of roles. Organizations were first and last 
"technical instruments" (Selznick, 1957), where the worker ["an irritant 
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that must be controlled"] (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983)] was "fitted" to a 
mechanical order of technical requirements. Driven by "a (maximizing 
and utilitarian) logic of cost and efficiency" organizational 
administration constituted an exercise in social engineering 
(Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939). 
Boundaries, however, need not always be so sharply drawn. It 
occurred to some that efficiency might be enhanced if structural 
boundaries were made less conspicuous. Control, that is, could be 
rendered less obtrusive and ultimately less conflictual, if the premises 
of decisions were encoded in organizational structure itself (Simon, 
1947; Perrow, 1979; Edwards, 1979). In this way, individual rationality 
is "bounded" within a skein of means-ends chains of management 
algorithms. Self-interest, idiosyncracy and novelty (i.e., 
irrationalities) are bracketed by the attention-directing structure 
embedded in organizational routine, language and official channels of 
communication (Simon, 1947). In short, prescribed behavior is subtly 
packaged in a cybernetic pyramid of Skinnerian boxes. The foreman was 
made superfluous after organizational control came to mean applying the 
right structure. In deciding on the limits of self-determination, 
management's principal task was to get its lines right. 
In sum, the conceptual closure (Thompson, 1967) assumed by closed 
rational models of organization takes the objective integrity of 
boundaries for granted. Boundaries shelter an aseptic, frictionless 
space - a management laboratory where, except for a limited set of 
variables, all others are controlled for. The organization as such 
exists (encapsulated) on its (management's) own terms, an independent 
variable. As the formal embodiment of management's expectations the 
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closed rational paradigm has come to represent the literature's 
unrequited anatomical ideal, one strongly imprinting the ontological 
contours of subsequent work. 
Interestingly, closed systems have not only served as the 
literature's analytical prototype, but the touchstone of conceptual 
tensions as well. That is, closed systems in any pure sense were 
destined to be short-lived, because the extraordinary levels of 
formalization prescribed simply required too many lines. The 
circumscribed autonomy prescribed by such models virtually begged for 
modification if efficiencies were to be achieved. In the final 
analysis, systems specifically designed to drive out efficiency-sapping 
contradictions like conflict and low morale succeeded in fostering the 
opposite, sending theorists and managers back to the proverbial drawing 
board. 
The Natural Systems Tradition 
Objectified notions of organizational boundary softened somewhat 
after Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) stumbled across the factory 
Gemeinschaft. Management to be sure still choreographed the formal 
organization. However, the discovery of work quotas, informal status 
hierarchies and leadership patterns indicated that overall 
organizational design could no longer be realistically claimed an 
exclusive management prerogative. Alienated workers proved adept at 
drawing lines too (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Management, it appeared, 
had lost the last word in defining task borders after workers were found 
to be busy interpreting them. 
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The interest in informal and small group processes spawned by the 
Hawthorne studies (Maier, 1952; Katz et al.f 1950; Homans, 1950; Whyte, 
1951; Sayles, 1958; Roy, 1952; Seashore, 1954) suggested that management 
did not impose boundaries so much as initiate them (Barnard, 1938). In 
other words, the concept of "social man" flirted with the radical 
possibility that structural boundaries were negotiable and corrigible 
and that rationality was only one goal among many. 
Concerned by the shopfloor backlash occasionally ignited by more 
overt and coercive forms of control, human relations pioneers campaigned 
to eliminate boundaries (and organizational politics) altogether 
(Barnard, 1938; Mayo, 1945). The costly apartheid dividing labor and 
management conflicted with the institution of a classless "condition of 
(moral) communion" (Barnard, 1938). Perhaps if the right incentives 
were implemented cultural authority might replace coercive authority. 
Boundaries might then be interiorized. Even distinctions between the 
informal and formal organization might be erased, "formal organizations 
arise out of and are necessary to informal organization; but when formal 
organizations come into operation, they create and require informal 
organizations" (Barnard, 1968: 120).1 
Excepting Barnard, then, and the work of Selznick (1948) and 
Parsons (1960), the Natural Model remained essentially contextless and 
inward-looking.2 However, the fact that organizational models were now 
inhabited - no longer lifeless - impacted thinking about boundary. 
Specifically, the presence of the informal organization admitted the 
possibility for tension between autonomy and imposed structure thereby 
creating theoretical space for interpretation, negotiation and change. 
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Open Systems 
The installation of the environment as the source of theoretical 
order signified the end of the literature's Ptolemaic legacy. No longer 
a self-sufficient, self-constituted entity, the organization is, in 
effect, decentered, reduced to a constituent part of a larger and more 
powerful constellation of organizations and constituencies (Katz & Kahn, 
1966). Within this new Copernican schema the environment sets varied 
adaptive tasks leaving managers little choice but to respond in some 
appropriate manner if the organization is to survive. Moreover, 
recognition of environmental whimsy introduces new requirements for 
structural flexibility complicating management's line-drawing functions. 
The combined "morphogenetic" needs of the organization and the 
environment (Buckley, 1967) transforms organizational boundaries, both 
internal and external, into improvisations. As concepts of boundary 
shed their static qualities, boundary maintenance develops into a 
management priority. The quixotic chase after the one best way to 
organize is finally laid to rest (Burns & Stalker, 1961). 
If environment acts and organizations react, then, organization 
design (boundary-setting) is never complete (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). 
"Social organizations, more variable and loosely coupled than biological 
systems, can and do fundamentally change their structural character¬ 
istics over time" (Scott, 1987: 83). At times, the environment may 
wreak havoc with organizational topography (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; 
Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976), but management, particularly in oligopolistic 
sectors of the economy, is not without options. For example, 
vulnerability can be reduced by appropriating environmental uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1975), or with a modicum of self-insight, enacting a more 
17 
manageable environment (Weick, 1979; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). Or, 
managers can engage in proactive policies by striking bargains with 
their respective environments. For instance, network models (Blau & 
Scott, 1962; Emery & Trist, 1965), resource dependency models (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) and a host of buffering and scanning strategies 
(Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1977) enable managers to effect an 
organizational/environmental accommodation. 
No doubt, the notions of environmental contingency and change made 
organizational design more difficult. Indeed, the new levels of 
uncertainty introduced by environmentally-induced contingencies 
underscored the need for concise boundaries. If the organization was to 
remain the central unit of analysis and seat of control, then its core 
rationality had to be insulated from environmental contingency and 
surprise. The definition of organizational boundary may have been 
revamped with the advent of the Open System perspective, but the need 
for boundary had not. 
Discussion: Recasting Boundary 
One's first impulse in the wake of this discussion is to conclude 
that concepts of organizational boundary have mellowed - turned more 
synthetic with age, particularly as theoretical models have grown more 
sociological in content and scope. However, closer inspection suggests 
that boundary-setting has not lost any of its original appeal. Granted, 
contemporary concepts of boundaries resemble semi-permeable membranes. 
But the literature's familiar ontological landmarks have endured because 
its basic text remains secure - the will to control (Edwards, 1979; 
Perrow; 1979; Scott, 1987; Ferguson, 1984). As a consequence, many 
18 
time-honored conceptual dichotomies have not been modified in any 
substantive way at all - particularly the pivotal binary polarity 
segregating insides (organizations) and outsides (environments). 
Without question, the relative complexities of the Natural and 
Open paradigms have interjected more contingency and uncertainty into 
the literature. Nonetheless, the desire for a predictable order 
operates undiminished. Implicitly, both the Natural and Open metaphors 
covet the metric sovereignty of the Rational prototype. The specialized 
structure of authority embodied in each of these germinal paradigms 
still turns on the coordinating oversight of a systems-designer. Each 
in its way privileges supervision. That is, each centers management to 
speak to things "as they are" (de Man, 1979). The control over the 
construction of boundary (and denomination) underwrites the literature's 
longstanding policy of containment - everything in its proper place 
(Zeitz, 1980). 
Complexing Organizational Boundary 
The Rational, Natural and Open paradigms not only share common 
boundaries, but all take the integrity of organizational/environmental 
frontiers for granted. For each of these structuralist templates 
precise boundaries are essential for delineating domains of function and 
control vital to the generic problem of order embodied in functionalist 
ontology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Perhaps Open Systems theory's 
fascination with organizational design constituted the high water mark 
for positioning organizational boundaries (Katz & Kahn, 1961; Thompson, 
1967). 
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The subsequent advent of Contingency Theory in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, however, made locating organizational boundaries a more 
daunting analytical task. For one, Contingency theory's preeminent 
interest in documenting proper "fits" between context and organizational 
design required a new level of organizational adaptability (Gresov, 
1989). Second, the literature's emphasis on environmental uncertainty 
(and corollary departure from norms of rationality) tended to obscure 
analytical lines even more (March & Simon, 1958; Cohen, March & Olsen, 
1977; Weick, 1976). Third, the sophistication of Contingency models - 
the addition of elusive concepts such as technology, power, and lateral 
linkages, for example - only exacerbated definitional and operational 
problems (Woodward, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; 
Perrow, 1968; Hage & Aiken, 1969; Pugh et al., 1969; Galbraith, 1973; 
Dachler & Wilpert, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981), since situating analytic 
boundaries is virtually impossible if conceptual elements cannot be 
elucidated with adequate precision (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990). 
Last, but not least, recognition of isomorphic contexts and 
interdependencies problematized the criteria used to differentiate 
"insides" from "outsides" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1983; Dimaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). Scott (1987) neatly captures 
the ontological problematic that these contingencies pose, "The nested 
nature of organizational environments as well as the penetration of 
organizations by their environments raises serious problems for 
investigators who are trying to decide where to draw boundaries for 
analytic purposes" (139). 
Each of these conditions places the identification and measurement 
of boundary in doubt. In their own way Contingency theorists 
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problematize the ontological status of boundary in their determined 
efforts to pin it down. Nevertheless, no one steps forward to grapple 
with the paradigmatic contradictions that these complex models present. 
Although conceptual boundary has become as porous as the Mexican- 
American border, by and large the organizational literature continues to 
treat organizational boundary as a concrete "thing." On occasion, the 
environment compels tactical realignments. But in the end, boundaries 
are known - something you can put your finger on. Despite the 
interpenetration of organizations and environments emphasized by 
Contingency theorists, it was still important to set organizations and 
environments apart. 
Enacting Boundary 
The development of a social constructionist track embodying less 
deterministic notions of social constraints and an expanding conception 
of human agency has brought to light the intersubjective side of 
boundary-setting (Geertz, 1973; Bittner, 1965; Berger & Luckman, 1967; 
Smircich, 1983). With this last "interpretive turn" (Geertz, 1983) 
theories of organization as closed representational objects were forced 
to compete with concepts of organizations as open texts that both 
generate meaning and subvert it (Brown, 1978; Gray, Bougon & Donnellon, 
1985; Johnson, 1990). 
Thus, uncomfortable with essentialist models of organization, a 
handful of scholars have come to view boundary as the intersection of 
organizational tensions (Weick, 1977; Benson, 1977; Brown, 1978; 
Giddens, 1979; Riley, 1983) - the locus of encounter. As boundaries are 
redefined as crucibles of reciprocative action analytic focus has 
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gradually turned to how we draw our lines (Van Maanen, 1979; Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979; Weick, 1979; Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Fiol, 1989; 
Milliken, 1990). Yet, despite the fact that concepts involving cohesive 
theoretical boundaries are virtually inverted in a subjectivist 
literature promoting the precarious status of organizational boundaries, 
the reality of the foundational organization/environment construct that 
organizational boundary undergirds is never in question. 
Summary 
One way to grasp the literature's seemingly abiding interest in 
organizational boundary is to consider the differing paradigms of 
organization which boundaries serve to perpetuate. To this end, the 
subjectivist perspective begins with a major conceptual advantage 
because it assumes that boundaries are pliant intersubjective 
conveniences demarking different conceptual terrains (Ranson, Hinings, & 
Greenwood, 1980). Thus, boundaries are by definition open to question. 
An interpretive epistemology, in other words, authorizes the proposal 
that whereas the evolving consistency of theoretical boundaries may 
reflect the literature's various concessions to changing social 
circumstances; nonetheless, boundary making continues to emanate from an 
unvarying (classical core) cognition of what organization is - a 
cognition grounded in a particular historical time and place (Geertz, 
1973a, 1973b). 
This enduring classical legacy is a product of an era when 
theorists and practitioners were free to draw their lines virtually at 
will. For practical and theoretical purposes, the external environment 
did not exist because countervailing interests were, often as not, too 
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weak to gain a vote in the boundary-setting processes monopolized by 
management elites (Edwards, 1979). The trademark castle-thick walls 
preferred by Classical theorists, therefore, encompassed an idealized 
concept of organization as the embodiment of a unitary, rational core. 
However, as the "needs" (read relative power) of the environment (read 
other constituencies, e.g., labor, consumers, government, etc.) 
expanded, managements were compelled to acknowledge other stakeholders 
(this recognition is implicitly reflected in Open Systems and later 
Contingency theory). Yet, deep at heart, the literature remained wedded 
to the central planning and control inherent in the Classical school's 
hierarchical, dedicated, mass-production industrial paradigm (Piore & 
Sabel, 1984; Graham, 1991). 
As yet more environmental exigencies spilled over fixed notions of 
organizational frontiers, theorists reacted by deploying two ontologies 
of boundary in a rearguard effort to preserve this core industrial 
identity. In effect, the core was encircled by two lines of defense. 
The first, outer, membrane-like ring consisted of an intersubjective 
ontology where environmental and organizational "fits” were enacted. 
This interactive rim was backed up by a second inner, objective frontier 
- a theoretical Maginot Line sheltering the literature's wellhead of 
coherent meaning. Theorizing within this "hermetically sealed 
tradition" (George & Campbell, 1990), Thompson (1967), for example, 
logically emphasizes the importance of buffering technical cores and 
regulating boundary spanning action. Such design strategies isolated 
the classical paradigm from environmentally induced uncertainty by 
withdrawing its hard core inward to a cool (dispassionate), 
incontestable, non-dialectical, reified "interior" (see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1. The Concentric Design of Organizational Ontology 
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This concept of concentric ontology also enables a reinter¬ 
pretation of more contemporary theorizing. Oliver Williamson's (1975; 
1981) influential analyses of transactions costs, for example, can now 
be seen to represent a form of conceptual retrenchment or irredentism 
wherein a problematic environment is ultimately subordinated to the 
static imperatives of the (core) centralized ideal. With boundary made 
permanent once again and the variability of the marketplace (the 
environment) thereby normalized, Williamson is able to restore the 
classical ideal to its original form. The theoretical core and the 
organization in its entirety are made one again (Figure 2.2). 
This suggests that the literature's boundaries preserve a way of 
thinking dedicated to the maintenance of a "fixed order" (Cox, 1981) of 
organizing. Boundaries, in other words, operate to constrain and often 
foreclose debate on the prospects and nature of change ignited by the 
global social and economic forces now underway (Attali, 1991). Thus, 
core theory remains blind to or incapable of explaining the complex 
interpenetrations of institutions and ideas arising from an environment 
driven by the "internationalization of economic authority" (George & 
Campbell, 1990), sweeping deregulation of traditional institutional 
structures (Graff, 1979; Dickson, 1984; Lyotard, 1984), and the 
dissemination of flexible manufacturing technologies (Nemetz & Fry, 
1988; Huber, 1990). 
At this point it becomes necessary to ask if the literature has 
unwittingly entered a Kuhnian (1962) watershed where prevailing 
functionalist concepts of organizing are simply too neat - too discrete 
- to engage the present swirl of interdependent events? Failure to 
"interrogate present knowledge", Der Derian (1989) warns in another 
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Figure 2.2. Transaction Cost Analysis: Containing Uncertainty With 
Prototype Form 
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literature but an admonishment perhaps no less meaningful for our own, 
not only cuts short the possibilities latent in the discovery of new 
discursive spaces (Graham, 1991), but runs the risk of reducing theory 
to a procrustean bed (Georgiou, 1973). 
This concern is exemplified in the recent January, 1992, AMJ 
article by Parthasarthy and Sethi where the authors attempt to force fit 
the dynamic integrative design implications of CAD-CAM technology into 
the inert symmetry of the classical paradigm. The irony, as Julie 
Graham (1991) points out, is that not only are scholars and 
practitioners authorized to imitate such conceptually incommensurable 
mixtures, but this kind of theorizing is often awarded credit for 
breaking new ground. 
The coherence and unity innate to regnant conceptualizations of 
organization, environment, and "fits” depend on margins that are clear- 
cut. However, it is the ambiguity surfacing in the wake of the 
institutional interpenetration taking place on no less than a global 
scale that is transforming hard, sharp boundaries into a problematic. 
The apparent disjuncture between the documented scale and reach of 
institutional interdependencies and the legacy of calibrated assumptions 
shaping organizational theory warrants an examination of the empirical 
consistency of organizational boundary. Since conceptualizations of 
organizations as bounded and predictable entities depend on boundaries 
being physically there, the possible epistemological ramifications 
surrounding this issue may profoundly affect how organizational 
normality and anomaly are represented. Ipso facto, a need exists to 
focus analysis on the ontology of boundary so that scholars can be more 
confident in the questions that they ask about organizing. But where 
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and how is this to be done? The next chapter (3) documents the 
interdependent condition of American research universities. Chapters 4 
and 5 discuss a pragmatic analytic approach to the these important 
issues. 
Endnotes 
1. Anticipating open systems and coalitional concepts, Barnard 
problematized a settled ontology of boundaries and organizations. 
Working from a macro-perspective of organizational action, Barnard 
prodded contemporaries to embrace a more inclusive model - one 
acknowledging environmental interdependencies. Hence, it is 
important to recognize that his cooperative ideal of organizing 
was not exclusively confined to employees ("insides"), but 
incorporated consumers, suppliers, and other constituents 
customarily left "outside" orthodox concepts. In Barnard's view, 
the "material of organizations" actualizes "When the acts of two 
or more individuals are cooperative, that is, systematically 
coordinated, the acts by my definition constitute an organization" 
(Barnard, 1940: 297). 
2. Selznick regarded the environment with frank suspicion. In his 
view management achieved pyrrhic victories at best when attempting 
to placate external constituencies (see his TVA and the 
Grassroots. 1949). Parsons tried to introduce a more balanced 
view of the environment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ENACTING AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 
The debate within the university centers on how the university can 
obtain added income from participation in commercial ventures while 
maintaining its integrity and basic values. 
National Science Board (1982) 
Introduction 
Proceeding from a social constructionist perspective, this research 
treats university boundaries as contingent social "achievements" (Brown, 
1978), and organizational "facts" (environments, hierarchies, rules, 
rationality, goals, etc.) as things derived (Silverman, 1971; Weick, 
1977; Manning, 1982; Riley, 1983; Bartunek, 1984; Ranson, Hinings & 
Greenwood, 1980; Giddens, 1979; Benson, 1977; Smircich & Stubbart, 
1985). Likewise, "organization" itself denotes a precarious ensemble 
of meanings and processes, tensions and contradictions (Benson, 1977, 
1983; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983; Gray, Bougon & Donnellon, 1985). 
Accordingly, the university qua organization neither qualifies as an 
island nor a non-contradictory whole. Indeed, the "university" as such 
does not exist. Rather, "it" is advanced as a socially constructed 
phenomenon predicated on an ongoing "negotiated consensus" reflecting 
the self-interested and competing claims of various stakeholders (Cyert 
& March, 1963; Ansoff, 1965; Ackoff, 1974; Freeman, 1984; Rule, 1988; 
Freeman, 1984; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Quinn & 
McGrath, 1985). 
Regarding the substantivity of academic boundaries, then, the 
interpretive appraisal foregrounds three interrelated themes in the 
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organizational literature. One, the concept of boundary underscores 
higher education's embeddedness within and indebtedness to a larger 
context (Granovetter, 1985: Clegg, 1990). To constitute elite 
universities in isolation (i.e., surrounded by high fixed walls) as 
Traditionalists (and to a lesser extent) Instrumentalists are wont to 
do underplays the reciprocative power relations linking universities to 
their environments. Second, the dialectical opposition between autonomy 
and discipline underlying the concept of boundary is a recurring, albeit 
unresolved, theme in the organizational literature (Barnard, 1938; 
Argyris, 1964; Lawler, 1977; Giddens, 1979; Perrow, 1986). And third, 
recognition of the inherent ambiguity of organizational boundary - that 
social boundaries are always pending - prompts us to regard boundaries 
as the dialectical dimension (rather than the mathematical space) where 
people confront their social arrangements (Benson, 1977). 
Research universities represent particularly attractive settings for 
exploring the substance of organizational boundary. For one, important 
constituencies are currently "negotiating" the normative lines 
governing "the way science is used in our societies and the way in which 
it is supposed to be generated" (Introduction to Gibbons & Wittrock, 
1985). In addition, important aspects of the concentric theoretical 
model introduced in the previous chapter are featured in this debate. 
"Traditionalists," for example, largely view academic partici¬ 
pation as essentially a "moral involvement" (Grimes & Cornwall, 1987). 
The incursion of remunerative considerations threatens to undo the 
established normative framework of solidarity and trust (incarnated in 
publication and peer review) underpinning the open community of 
scholars. In particular, the university's signifying (core) 
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educational, knowledge producing and, not least, critical functions are 
in danger of being compromised by the myopic, profit imperatives driving 
major business benefactors, regardless of honest intentions. Thus, 
although the American university exists in a perpetual state of fiscal 
dependency, making partnerships with government and major industrial 
interests1 obligatory; nonetheless, the implications of these power- 
skewed coalitions for the university's social-organizational structure 
cannot be underestimated. 
The Instrumentalist, on the other hand, visualizes new 
entrepreneural university/industry arrangements as mutually pragmatic. 
The university wins a steady source of research money without an excess 
of government red tape, help from industry in making new discoveries 
commercially useful, potential employment opportunities for its 
students, and stimulating faculty-industry interactions. For its part, 
industry gains access to new sources of ideas and technology, a source 
of potential research employees, and the ability to draw on top 
scientists without having to expand in-house research capacity. In 
sum, industrial/university arrangements represent a natural and 
pragmatic closure between university science and the "scientified" 
vanguard of industry (Stankiewicz, 1986). 
These synopses capture the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist antithesis 
on a factual level. But theoretical purposes require that this 
opposition be converted into the specifications of the concentric 
metaphor. For example, as with orthodox organizational theory, both 
Traditionalists and Instrumentalists share the efficacy of insides 
(order) and outsides (disorder). That the university and its 
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environment coexist in a dichotomy of separate realms is taken as fact. 
But a key theoretical difference separates the two discourses. 
Specifically, Traditionalists and Instrumentalists attribute 
different ontologic meanings (substantivities) to organizational 
boundary because each situates organization/environmental tensions in a 
different theoretical place. Traditionalists, as we have seen, 
concentrate on the integrity of the academy's purported core repository 
of first principles. In light of the alleged hegemonic reach of the 
marketplace, the Traditionalist takes every precaution to insulate the 
core behind a indelible bulwark of permanent, impregnable walls. 
Instrumentalists, on the other hand, locate the industry/ university 
interface at a reasonably safe distance from the core - at the academy's 
fringes. This theoretical separation, then, allows the Instrumentalist, 
unlike the Traditionalist, to sleep through the night. Market 
imperatives notwithstanding, it is not in industry's long-term self- 
interest to tamper with the academy's core intellectual processes. 
Traditionalists need to face up to the fact that American universities 
have never enjoyed an extrahistorical immunity to "worldly motives". 
Indeed, the Instrumentalist contends, the university's social relevance 
depends on two-way interactions, not obstructionism. Besides, in 
addition to the equilibrium inherent in situations governed by mutual 
self-interest, preservation of the academy's core values is assured as 
long as the university's distinctive educational and communications 
mechanisms are contractually sanctioned (buffered) (Reams, 1986). 
In sum, two items can be inferred from this discussion. One, the 
continued unproblematic status of the literature's intellectual core 
depends upon which discourse ultimately predominates. The moral unity 
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of the core paradigm is predicated completely on the factual reality of 
fixed Traditionalist boundaries. The osmotic nature of Instrumentalist 
boundaries, on the other hand, problematizes the core's exclusive 
"conditions of possibility" (Miller & O'Leary, 1989). In effect, if 
coherent boundaries are not validated by our findings, two things 
happen. The assumed congruence of the core is opened to doubt. Also, 
theory is nudged closer to adopting a more macro (Barnardian) 
perspective - one incorporating "insides" and "outsides." 
Second, it is consistent to consider the Traditionalist and 
Instrumentalist discourses as theoretical enactments in themselves. 
Indeed, the opposition they enact is not the product of a single, 
priviledged reading, but grounded in a genealogy of past events. Just as 
the concentric organizational model was a response to specific 
historical circumstances, there is similar cause to articulate the 
Traditionalist/Instrumentalist negotiation as an ongoing and reciprocal 
social engagement with a dynamic social environment (Graff, 1985). 
Indeed, a strong argument can be made that from the beginning, 
autonomy was out of the question for an institution charged with the 
training and enculturation of future generations of American citizens 
(Wolin, 1981). As both patrons and benefactors of education, industry 
and the state maintained an abiding ideological interest in curriculum, 
research and faculty hiring practices (Noble, 1977; Wolin, 1981; Price, 
1986). "...the relationship between higher education and social change 
is circular and interdependent with both transforming each other 
(Jarausch, 1983: 9). Later, with the consolidation of industry, 
government and science during and after WWII, the university moved from 
the sidelines to the center of the nation's modernization process. A 
33 
host of factors including the continued academization and 
scientification of key technologies has opened the door for new profit- 
motivated business/ university alliances. The following sections 
describe these developments in more detail. 
Universitv/Industrv Relations: An Interpretive History 
In the Beginning: At Arm's Length 
Since the turn of the century and before, corporate philanthropy has 
supplemented university capital budgets and underwritten university- 
based research. In return, the American university has supplied 
industry with "applied, fundamental research, and research manpower" 
recognized even at that time as essential to the continued development 
of science-based industry (Noble, 1977: 128). Over the years, the 
university/industry linkage was strengthened by scholarships, faculty 
consultancies, research grants and outright gifts. Businessmen served 
as university trustees as well as benefactors and some academic 
departments (engineering, natural sciences and management) tailored 
their curriculums to correspond with industry needs (NSB, 1982). 
Industrys' interest were largely utilitarian. The university 
contributed by "critically reviewing and systemitizing the accumulated 
technical knowledge" and trained future workers and researchers 
(Stankiewicz, 1986). Not least, sponsoring university research has 
allowed business to shift some of the cost and risk of basic research to 
the public sector (Noble, 1977; Dickson, 1984). 
Although private and industrial endowments played a leading role 
prior to the turn of the century, colleges and universities continued to 
stress basic science and teaching. The bulk of Ph.D.s sought work 
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within the academy. No direct link existed between Ph.D. production and 
industrial requirements. Although always interested in new discovery 
industrial research remained devoted to improving manufacturing 
processes and the exploration of new product applications. Thus, on the 
whole, the knowledge transfer mechanisms between the university and 
industry could generally be characterized as indirect because industrial 
technology was largely ad hoc and empirical. 
However, industry interest in university research increased 
dramatically with the advent of large science-based industries - 
electrical and chemical - during the first decades of the twentieth 
century (Baer, 1978). The impetus of the First World War ("the 
chemists' war"), combined with the mushrooming list of new products 
emerging from industrial laboratories and independent research 
institutes served to reinforce industry's linkage to science - and the 
university. As a result, direct links between the university and 
industry multiplied. For example, the number of graduate fellowships 
climbed even during the Depression, gifts of specialized equipment 
increased along with the practice of industrial consultantships (NSB, 
1982: 219-220). But David Noble (1977) cautions that this intensifying 
relationship was more than a marriage of mutual convenience: 
Perhaps more important, it (industry sponsorship of university 
research) redefined the form and content of scientific research 
itself. This involved more than the general shift away from the 
search for truth and toward utility which had already been well 
underway by the turn of the century. Now the shift toward 
utility assumed particular forms, molded by the specific, 
historical needs of private industry....This reorientation 
affected not only what kinds of questions would be asked but 
also what particular questions would be asked, which problems 
would be investigated, what sorts of solutions would be sought, 
what conclusions would be drawn. Science had, indeed, been 
pressed into the service of capital (147). 
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A_New Federal/University Contract: The Room Years 1942-1966 
While industry support for university research more than doubled 
between 1953 and 1966, given the unprecedented infusion of federal 
monies, its share of total university R&D support declined sharply from 
eight to two percent (Baer, 1978: 63). Indeed, in the two decades 
following WWII the federal share of R&D support steadily increased 
eventually peaking at 74 percent of all university R&D in 1966 and 77 
percent of all basic campus research (Baer, 1978: 63). By 1966, 
colleges and universities accounted for 46 percent of the total funds 
for basic research. (This figure climbed to 53 percent in 1975.) 
•••despite great fiscal pressures, universities managed to increase and 
consolidate their positions... as the predominant performers of basic 
research in the United States" (Baer, 1978: 71). 
Not surprisingly, the links between the university and industry 
softened during this period (Baer, 1978; Dickson, 1984). The glamour of 
high-tech, performance-oriented defense and space related work drew 
faculty and newly-minted PhDs away from more conventional industrial 
research. Virtually overnight, academic work was exciting, lavishly 
funded and with a shortage of Ph.D.s - jobs plentiful. "In an 
expanding era it all too easy to believe that only the second-rate 
student or worse need be relegated to industry, government, or 
nonresearch teaching positions" (Baer, 1978: 86). Industry went 
begging, prompting a vice president of R&D at Koppers to complain that 
"Too many (employable candidates) are overspecialized in (disciplinary) 
training and not interested in broadening their horizons" (Baer, 1978: 
86). Other forces were also at work. Specifically, industry's share of 
total basic research funds slipped from 36 percent in 1955 to 22 percent 
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by 1966 (to 16 percent by 1975) (Baer, 1978: 66). Among other things, 
inflation and an uncertain economy in the late '60s and early '70s 
induced management to emphasize applied over basic research. 
Nonetheless, despite these events the original motives for 
industry/university collaboration remained intact. Indeed, the 
"systemic institutionalized connection" (Ravetz, 1971: 38) between 
important science and industry may have actually been fortified. The 
growing allocation of federal dollars during the war and again in the 
years between the Sputnik launch (1957) and 1966 helped to prepare the 
way for the renewed industry/university collaborations that were to 
follow. 
Science and the university were never quite the same again. For 
example: 
1) In short order, university science was transformed into Big 
"industrialized" Science (Ravetz, 1971) - a capital- and labor- 
intensive activity highly sensitive to cyclical changes in 
funding patterns. Following the example set by the Manhattan 
Project during the war, science was hereafter to be performed by 
large, specialized teams working with sophisticated and 
expensive equipment. "This change is as radical as that which 
occurred in the productive economy when independent artisan 
producers were displaced by capital-intensive factory production 
employing hired labor" (Ravetz, 1971: 44). No school, much less 
a department or individual scientist, could afford to pay for 
research independently. Alliances with outside sources - even 
government in peacetime - were now taken for granted. 
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2) The immense cost associated with modern laboratory research 
mandated new forms of accountability and distribution. 
Henceforth, decisions effecting the content and trajectory of 
university research were concentrated in a handful of mission- 
oriented agencies (AEC, NASA, DOD, Office of Naval Research, the 
NSF, etc.). "With this concentration of powers of decision and 
control, the free marketplace of scientific results, whose value 
is established after they are offered and by informal consensus, 
is replaced by an oligopoly of investing agencies, whose prior 
decisions determine what will eventually come on to the market" 
(Ravetz, 1971: 45). Savvy university scientists quickly adapted 
to this new entrepreneurial (fund-raising) and administrative 
(bureaucratic) environment. Moreover, the unprecedented 
expenses involved insured that basic research was concentrated 
in a few dozen select universities (Muller in Logsdon). Not 
every campus was awarded a cyclotron. 
3) The massive infusion of federal funds spawned a widespread R&D 
infrastructure consisting of university and government 
laboratories, non-profit research institutions, in-house 
industrial research, and a new class of federally funded 
research and development centers (FFRDC's) managed by both 
universities and industrial firms. The relationships within 
this R&D network directly correlate with the level of federal 
support. These relationships, therefore, became highly 
competitive after federal monies stabilized after 1966-67. In 
addition, the FFRDC's allowed university faculty opportunity to 
divide their time between academic and non-academic project 
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environments and form working connections within business and 
government. These connections prepared the ground for 
subsequent complaints about "conflicts of institutional 
interest" that surfaced in the late 1970s. 
4) Formed in the crucible of the Second World War, the tensions of 
the cold war, and the rise of the new global economy the new 
alliance permanently binding the university to the needs of 
industry and the state was built on three on-going rationales 
directly affecting the autonomy of the university. One, that 
on-campus research had to acquire more relevance. Relevant to 
whom and to what ends was customarily decided by whoever was 
paying for the research. Given the ever rising cost of high- 
tech research the call for academic relevance was, in effect, 
self-justifying. For example, Lyndon Johnson wanted expensive 
university research to serve the (health, environmental, urban 
and educational) needs of his Great Society program. The Nixon 
adminis- tration used "irrelevance" to justify dismantling many 
scientific projects (e.g., NASA) after the Vietnam-stretched 
economy began to manifest symptoms of over-heating (in real 
terms, federal support for basic research decreased by 10% 
between 1968 and 1971) (Dickson, 1984: 29). Second, that 
scientific discovery could be managed, and, if warranted, the 
scientific establishment mobilized to serve the needs of the 
state in times of crisis. The Manhattan Project was the 
archetypical case, of course. But science was to be mobilized 
by international exigencies again with the surprise launch of 
the Russian Sputnik satellite in 1957. Since the mid-1970's 
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university science has been redirected to the specific needs of 
industry as the Carter and Reagan administrations looked to 
science and technology to fend off stagflation - and the 
Japanese; while university officials sought more reliable 
funding sources. And finally, science was reconceptualized as 
an investment rather than simply overhead (Dickson, 1984). In 
other words, even though the contribution of science to economic 
expansion can only be assumed at this time, science was now 
deemed central to the expansion of capital and favorable 
balances of trade. "The theory that began to emerge was that, 
in the long run, the economy would remain healthy only through a 
continuous infusion of new technological innovations - and that 
this could be assured only by continued support for basic 
science" (Dickson, 1984: 32). 
1973 to the Present: The New Consolidation 
Juxtaposed to the business/university estrangement of the 1960's, 
ties between select universities and industry grew measureably stronger 
over the next two decades. Industry support for total university R&D 
rose from 3% in the late 1970's to 5% in 1984 (due to the immense 
federal science budget, industry's share had tumbled from 10% in 1955 to 
3% in 1978) (Stankiewicz, 1986:21). Indeed, in constant terms, 
industrial support doubled between 1966 and 1978 (Stankiewicz, 1986) and 
expanded by 8.5% per year, on average, between 1981-1984 - surpassing 
increases in industrial in-house research expenditure (NSB). There were 
other indicators of change as well. For example, even though employment 
in high-tech firms was declining between 1981 and 1983, 4,800 doctoral 
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scientists and engineers (about 3% of the total) moved from the academia 
to industry, while 1,700 moved in the other direction (NSB). In 
addition, from 1973 to 1982 the proportion of industry authored papers 
with academic co-authors jumped from 13 to 24 percent (NSB). This ratio 
was even higher in biology (50%) and biomedicine and clinical medicine 
(NSB). 
The pendulum is swinging back the other way. Universities are 
seeking long-term research support, free of government overhead and red 
tape, and industrial firms are seeking greater control over the 
direction of new scientific and technological developments and a greater 
proprietary interest in these developments (Noble & Pfund, 1980). 
Briefly, this shift is generally attributed to the following factors: 
(1) Industry's switch in research strategy from "defensive research" 
(product incrementalism and manufacturing process improvements) to a 
more product innovative emphasis; (2) America's entrance into a "post- 
fabricative" era (Rose, 1985) entailing a structural shift away from 
traditional manufacturing industry to reliance on a new high-tech, 
science-propelled economy (computers and related industy, genetic 
engineering); (3) industry's consequent renewed interest in fundamental 
research sectors (the university); and (4) White House anxiety over the 
erosion of the country's technological lead to other industrialized 
nations. As of late, this trajectory has been lubricated with new and 
more liberal interpretations of patent laws and significant tax breaks 
for industry research expenditures (the Economic Recovery Tax of 1981). 
Innovation emerged a national priority in the Nixon, Carter and Reagan 
eras. Brains had come to represent the new competitive trump card, 
"...intellectual capital - scientific resources and the aptitude for 
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technological innovation - constitutes the major asset of industrialized 
countries in the new modes of international competition and inter¬ 
dependence" (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
1980: 20). 
Not surprisingly, the new competitive highground embodied in the 
mobilization of scientific and technical innovation fostered new 
linkages between industry, state and university. Overall, these changes 
entailed a quantum change in science policy. One, support for basic 
research was to be largely channeled into those areas of research that 
held promise to make industry more competitive. Particularly under 
Reagan, the private sector was given the upper hand in setting the 
research agenda (Dickson, 1984). Second, the application of research 
outcomes was to be largely determined by the private sector and market 
forces (Dickson, 1984; Noble & Pfund, 1980). 
Unlike the paramount purpose of government-sponsored research 
with universities where furtherance of the public interest is 
the goal, industry investments in university research are by 
desire and obligation centered on the ultimate goal of making a 
profit....When investing in university research, industry often 
will place its ultimate profit goal ahead of any service 
interest to the public at large. With the contracts between 
industry and universities and the resulting shift from public 
to private investment in research, a new forum is created which 
is governed by different rules and goals (Reams, 1986: 107). 
The new partnership took many forms, some old and some new. For 
example, traditional cross-fertilization in the form of increased 
industrial consultancies, grants and fellowships was reemphasized. 
"Connections between industrial research associations and universities 
also gained new prominence" (NSB: 233). But, chary of the relatively 
fickle nature of federal funding cycles, university administrators and 
researchers increasingly sought more permanent and stable alliances. In 
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"Internally," the intensity of mixed-sector interconnections and their 
possible repercussions on the academy's "practical consciousness" 
(Giddens, 1979) (the largely tacit knowledge individuals use to define 
and navigate social environments) has varied by discipline. For 
example, while the financial condition of the liberal arts remains 
highly problematic (Daniels, 1989; Berger, 1989), over the last decade 
university-based researchers in some natural sciences have been 
allegedly exposed to unprecedented pressure to commercialize their work. 
These pressures seem to be particularly acute in rapidly developing 
technologies where innovation depends entirely on large-scale, high-tech 
research motivated by the prospect of vast commercial reward (Fuchsberg, 
1989) . 
This suggests that no single discourse of science (the academy) can 
be said to prevail today. Indeed, contemporary scientific discourse 
might well be characterized as a cacophony of voices. As the 
Pons/Fleischmann episode indicates, even practicing scientists are 
experiencing difficulty understanding one another (Raymond, 1989). What 
is clear, however, is that opinion differs sharply as to the boundaries 
delineating the spheres of academic and market behavior. 
Negotiating University Boundaries 
From an interpretive point of view, the unanswered question is what 
are the consequences for the academy's purported core "provinces of 
meanings" (Ranson, Hinings & Greenwood, 1980) if university-based 
science is redefined as a business asset? Accordingly, this research 
treats the Traditionalist and Instrumentalist schools as "rival frames 
of reference" (Smircich, 1983a) - each denoting a singular "way of 
44 
knowing" grounded in perceptions about the function of knowledge 
(Lyotard, 1979). The Instrumentalist, for example, purportedly values 
knowledge for its use-value - its potential for product realization. In 
contrast, the Traditionalist validates the heuristic power of knowledge. 
The domain of a particular frame or discourse - "what one chooses 
to bracket and pay attention to" (Smircich, 1983) - is enacted through 
linguistic relationships that prescribe the cognitive boundaries of 
permissable conversational and social intercourse. The university's 
various constituencies, in other words, interpret action according to 
the constructed boundaries they set for themselves (inside) and others 
(outside) (Brown, 1978; Weick, 1979; Putnam & Pacanowsky, 1983; Conrad, 
1983). 
From this perspective, social boundaries emerge from interpretive 
consensus or conflict (Conrad, 1983). If the product of consensus, 
boundaries demarking relatively stable patterns of meaning and structure 
tend to grow thicker and more opaque with regular use (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966). As products of a social context, however, the content 
and rules of discourse are inherently unstable (Calas, 1987). Disputed 
boundaries entailing clashes between competing interpretations sometimes 
lead to structural change. Conflicted boundaries, therefore, figure as 
boundaries "under discussion." 
The partisan split over the contemporary dynamics of university/ 
industry relations qualifies American research universities as prime 
examples of organizations where boundaries encompassing values, norms, 
and meaning structures are under discussion. Every opinion composing 
this discourse radiates outward from the basic pro-market (Lyon, 1982); 
NSF, 1982; Reams, 1986; Lynton & Elman, 1987; Powers, 1988) non-market 
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(Noble & Pfund, 1980; Dickson, 1984; Nelkin, 1984; Rule, 1988; Schaffer, 
1989) opposition.3 To enlist with one side or the other, therefore, is 
to affiliate with a different set of boundaries regarding the purpose of 
university-produced knowledge, its mode of production and the standards 
by which it is judged relevant (Lentricchia & McLaughlin, 1990).4 
Thus, Traditionalists view academic and industrial science as two 
distinct cultural realms each with its own logic and authority (Nelkin, 
1984; Dickson, 1984; Krimsky, 1987; Schaffer, 1989). Research is deemed 
a form of power and intention and the progeny of a vulnerable (and 
venerable) social structure. To the Instrumentalist, on the other hand, 
research is not to be indulged as an esoteric exercise, but employed as 
a practical instrument of social and economic transformation. As the 
laboratories of social change, universities are obliged to strike a 
bargain with the marketplace (Prager & Omenn, 1980; Rosenzweig, 1982; 
Fowler, 1984; OECD, 1984; Lynton, 1987). Instrumentalists propose to 
"modernize" campus science by revamping its normative boundaries. 
Traditionalists prefer to quarantine university science by reinforcing 
boundaries purportedly already in place. In the final analysis, each 
perspective wants to impose a different moral structure (Etzioni, 1971; 
Gibbons & Wittrock, 1985; Grimes & Cornwall, 1987). 
A deductive reading of the topical Traditionalist/Instrumentalist 
literature finds that the opposition between these two frames of 
reference is replayed along the dimensions shown below. Samples of 
Traditionalist and Instrumentalist opinion statements used in our 
subject survey follow each category. 
Property - Traditionalists believe that the proprietary logic of the 
competitive marketplace will drive open intellectual discourse (the 
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(Noble & Pfund, 1980; Dickson, 1984; Nelkin, 1984; Rule, 1988; Schaffer, 
1989) opposition.3 To enlist with one side or the other, therefore, is 
to affiliate with a different set of boundaries regarding the purpose of 
university-produced knowledge, its mode of production and the standards 
by which it is judged relevant (Lentricchia & McLaughlin, 1990).4 
Thus, Traditionalists view academic and industrial science as two 
distinct cultural realms each with its own logic and authority (Nelkin, 
1984; Dickson, 1984; Krimsky, 1987; Schaffer, 1989). Research is deemed 
a form of power and intention and the progeny of a vulnerable (and 
venerable) social structure. To the Instrumentalist, on the other hand, 
research is not to be indulged as an esoteric exercise, but employed as 
a practical instrument of social and economic transformation. As the 
laboratories of social change, universities are obliged to strike a 
bargain with the marketplace (Prager & Omenn, 1980; Rosenzweig, 1982; 
Fowler, 1984; OECD, 1984; Lynton, 1987). Instrumentalists propose to 
"modernize" campus science by revamping its normative boundaries. 
Traditionalists prefer to quarantine university science by reinforcing 
boundaries purportedly already in place. In the final analysis, each 
perspective wants to impose a different moral structure (Etzioni, 1971; 
Gibbons & Wittrock, 1985; Grimes & Cornwall, 1987). 
A deductive reading of the topical Traditionalist/Instrumentalist 
literature finds that the opposition between these two frames of 
reference is replayed along the dimensions shown below. Samples of 
Traditionalist and Instrumentalist opinion statements used in our 
subject survey follow each category. 
Property - Traditionalists believe that the proprietary logic of the 
competitive marketplace will drive open intellectual discourse (the 
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lynchpin of the academic social matrix) underground (Chubin, 1985; 
Broad, 1988; Bourke, 1989). Instrumentalists answer that varying 
degrees of secrecy and competition are inherent in the social relations 
of science (e.g., priority claims) (Rosenzweig, 1982; Hull, 1985). 
Traditionalist Opinion Statement: Science is nourished by free and 
open exchanges of information. There is no place for proprietary 
knowledge in the academy. 
Instrumentalist Opinion Statement: Modest changes in university 
rules regarding intellectual property will allow commercial activities 
to go forward without threatening traditional values. 
Entrepreneurism - The Traditionalist argues that the narrow, self- 
oriented ethos of capital is diametrically opposed to the deontological 
traditions of academic science (Werth, 1988; Leary, 1989; Minsky & 
Noble, 1989). The Instrumentalist replies that academic science today 
underwrites the nation's military and economic security. Like it or 
not, in modern societies universities are key factors of production. 
For those idealists who still entertain doubts, passage of the 
University and Small Business Patent Act of 1980 and other legislation 
makes the university's commercial status official (Rosenzweig, 1985; 
Gupta, 1990). 
Traditionalist Opinion Statement: If you make the ethics of 
academic science the same as Wall Street, you're going to corrupt 
science. 
Instrumentalist Opinion Statement: There's nothing inappropriate 
for academic scientists, while holding regular academic appointments, to 
be proprietors, exclusively or jointly, in private business firms in 
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which scientific knowledge gained in their academic capacity is to be 
used. 
Disinterestedness - According to Traditionalists, the existence of a 
unified scientific community with its exceptional social relationships 
and functions (the dialectical processes of discovery, education and 
critique - a sanctuary for tradition, diversity and independent 
commentary) necessitate an uncommon degree of institutional autonomy 
(Leavitt, 1988; Wheeler, 1989; Blum, 1990). The Instrumentalist replies 
that "American universities are among the most permeable of social 
institutions" (Rosenzweig, 1985: 41). Universities and good science 
have never existed in isolation, but do their best work when fulfilling 
societal needs. Corporate and public interest are virtually identical, 
and commerce is the most efficacious route to public use of academic 
invention (Prager and Omenn, 1980). 
Traditionalist Opinion Statement: Limits should be placed on how 
much time faculty can devote to outside concerns. The one-fifth rule 
allowing one day per week is fair and adequate. 
Instrumentalist Opinion Statement: Conflicts of interest can be 
minimized or avoided altogether by vigilance and good faith. 
Choice and Design of Work - Caldart (1983) conveys the 
Traditionalist fear of Huxleyian subversion when he writes "the fabric 
of academic research could be slowly rewoven on industry's loom." 
Indeed, the practical consequences of such cultural experimentation 
(university/industry alliances) are clear. More and more academic 
scientists will come to think like their industry counterparts (Ashford, 
1983; Goldman, 1987; Nelkin & Nelson, 1987). Industry may be driven by 
self-interest, the Instrumentalist admits, but its leadership is not 
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unaware of the contribution of basic research to the on-going health of 
commercial infrastructure and corporate competitiveness. This awareness 
assures that the needs of basic science are not about to be sacrificed 
for short-term financial gain (Stankiewicz, 1986; Bleveins & Ewer, 
1988) . 
Traditionalist Opinion Statement: With industrial support, there is 
relatively less freedom for the researcher because there is now a single 
line to follow, the line of the generous benefactor. 
Instrumentalist Opinion Statement: The legal safeguards built into 
large corporate-university contracts plus procedural limits established 
by the university are more than adequate to protect the institutional 
autonomy of the academic scientific community. 
The Organization of Work - The Traditionalist worries that because 
large contractual arrangements increase industry's proprietary 
"presence" on campus (Caldart, 1983), more pressure will be created to 
remake academic departments into profit centers. In addition, 
departmental sovereignty will be further undermined by the multi¬ 
disciplinary nature of technocratic problem solving (Krimsky, 1987; 
Minsky, 1989). The Instrumentalist believes that such claims are 
unfounded (Roy, 1972). 
Traditionalist Opinion Statement: Policy concerning university- 
industry relations should be set and resolved at the department level. 
(Both statements in this category expressed Traditionalist opinion.) 
Collectivity - The Traditionalist holds that action occurs at the 
cultural/structural level; actors create and manuever within shared 
social frames that constrain choice (Gibbons & Wittrock, 1985; Rule, 
1988; Harris, 1989; McDonald, 1990). Whereas, the Instrumentalist 
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counters that while prudence is called for there is no hard evidence to 
show that new university/industry alliances will place any more pressure 
to sacrifice university traditions than in the past (Rosenzweig, 1982). 
Traditionalist Opinion Statement: There are bound to be adverse 
consequences in terms of collaboration among faculty in various 
departments if one group must worry about protecting corporate rights to 
licenses. (Both statements in this category expressed Traditionalist 
opinion.) 
Quality Control - The Traditionalist is concerned that peer review 
will be displaced as the marketplace arbiters the direction, process and 
quality of academic work. Furthermore, the temptation to cheat will 
increase as independent replicative and quality control mechanisms are 
bypassed (Fuchsberg, 1989; McDonald, 1989; Crease & Samios, 1991). 
Instrumentalists hold that formal (contractual) regulations are 
sufficient to protect the integrity of the academy's formal and informal 
work practices (Bremer, 1985; Reams, 1986). 
Traditionalist Opinion Statement: Corporate sponsorship should be 
subject to peer review. 
Instrumentalist Opinion Statement: Too much weight is given to the 
role of peer-reviewed journals in the process of scientific 
communication. Science doesn't not exist until it is published. 
Reward Structure/Facultv Recruitment Criteria - For a variety of 
environmental and contractual reasons, the Traditionalist asserts, 
current university/industry alliances are qualitatively different from 
the philanthropic relationships of the past (Noble & Pfund, 1980). One 
result is that grantsmanship activities will be made an integral part of 
faculty hiring and tenure processes (Holtzman, 1985; Rule, 1988). The 
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Instrumentalist would likely reply that this is no time to lament a lost 
(romantic) vision of the world. It might not be a bad idea if all 
faculty were obliged to develop revenue-generating projects as part of 
their academic responsibility. Why not make a professor's ability to 
generate funds a condition of tenure? 
Instrumentalist Opinion Statement: It does not make any difference 
if the private sector replaces or complements government as the patron 
of science as long as the professional reward system of academe is 
preserved. (Both statements in this category expressed Instrumentalist 
opinion.) 
These oppositions (rendered schematically in Figure 3.1) provide the 
conceptual building material for the faculty boundary construction to 
follow. Confidence in the validity of the Traditionalist/ 
Instrumentalist discourse and the ontology of the literature's concepts 
of boundary, organizations, and environments will depend on how faculty 
representing different disciplines and market involvements draw their 
lines. For example, is membership in the academy today motivated by an 
overriding moral commitment to an altruistic Mertonian ideal5 (Etzioni, 
1971; Argyris, 1975), or are faculty gravitating toward new instru- 
mentally-motivated extramural allegiances (Silverman, 1971; Cummings, 
1977; Etzkowitz, 1983) - some conflation of the two, or something 
altogether novel? The empirical responses to these questions should 
shed some light on whether the lines constructed by those presumably 
directly involved in the construction of academic boundaries, i.e., 
active faculty, validate the a priori isolation of organizations and 
environments. 
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VALUES 
TRADITIONALIST 
The University as a Non-Economic 
Institution 
Classical Form: Knowledge is virtue: university 
a public investment, public interest science. 
Clear boundaries between academic and industrial 
science. Ambiguity accompanies each benefit of 
university/industry partnerships - a crisis of 
identity for the university (Noble & Pfund, 1980; 
Nelkin, 1984; Rule, 1988; Schaffer, 1989). 
INSTRUMENTALIST 
The University as an 
Economic Institution 
Foundation of Industrial Society: 
Knowledge as productivity. Clear social 
benefits. The University is an adaptive 
institution. The object is to strike a 
bargain with the marketplace. The 
university is a public and private 
resource (Lyon, 1982; Reams, 1986; 
Lynton & Elman, 1987). 
Contradictory Tensions 
The tensions emanating from this debate 
bring out the latent contradictions of 
the university as a "unity of opposites." 
These are expressed as explicit an¬ 
tagonisms involving academic norms and 
practice. 
STRUCTURE 
Normative Structure 
BEHAVIOR 
Practice/Identity 
The academy as a collectivity: Com¬ 
mitment understood as a moral involvement. 
Clear restraints on acquisitiveness and 
rivalry. The subordination of ego. 
General references to levels of trust and 
academic values (Nelkin, 1984; Grimes & 
Cornwall, 1987; Etzkowitz, 1989). 
Property: The limits of ownership of 
intellectual property; the commodification 
of knowledge and the issue of secrecy 
(Nelkin, 1984; Noble & Pfund, 1980; 
Gibbons & Wittrick, 1985). 
Choice & Design of Work: Work to be 
controlled by internal or external 
constituencies? For science or industry? 
Applied vs. Basic? The respective 
emphases on teaching, research, and 
service (Etzkowitz, 1989; Langitt, et 
al., 1983; Rosenzweig, 1982). 
The Organization of Work: The integrity 
of departmental structure. Commitments 
to outside institutions (consulting, 
advisory roles, etc.). Increasing 
administrative control; funding patterns 
(Etzkowitz, 1989; Krimsky, 1987; Noble & 
Pfund, 1980; Fuchsberg, 1989). 
Entrepreneur!sm: Membership characterized 
by instrumental, calculative involvement. 
The university is a tool to other ends. 
Competition valued (Fuchsberg, 1989; 
Krimsky, 1987; Etzkowitz, 1983). 
Quality Control: Integrity of peer re¬ 
view process - publication, openness, 
faculty oversight (Krimsky, 1987; 
Fuchsberg, 1989; Giamatti, 1983; Gibbons 
& Wittrock, 1985). 
Disinterestedness: Critical/interpretive 
function based on intellectual freedom. 
Allegiance to knowledge alone. Intellectual 
and political autonomy essential. Sensitive 
to conflicts of interest (Krimsky, 1987; 
Schaffer, 1989) 
Reward Structure: Sources of recognition 
and status - based on market or academic 
criteria? Criteria for promotion 
(Krimsky, 1987; Etzkowitz, 1989; Rule, 
1988; Fuchsberg, 1989; Giamatti, 1983). 
Recruitment of Faculty and Students: 
(Etzkowitz, 1983; Krimsky, 1987; Prager 
& Ommen, 1980; Minsky & Noble, 1989; 
Reams, 1986). 
Figure 3.1. The Components of Discourse: A Conceptual Schema of the 
Traditionalist/Instrumentalist Literature 
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End Notes 
1. Steep entry costs effectively preclude small and medium-size 
business - see Baer, 1978. 
2. For a detailed description of the various forms these relation¬ 
ships take see the taxonomy developed by Nelkin and Nelson (1987). 
3. This is not to subscribe to the claim that actors are entirely free 
from the structure implicit in regularities and commonalities (see 
Giddens, 1979; Ranson, Hinings & Greenwood, 1980; Manning, 1982; 
Benson, 1983; Riley, 1983). 
4. This claim is grounded in my deductive reading of relevant 
literature. The themes outlined in Figure 3.1 surfaced time and 
again. 
5. In his classic essay, "The Normative Structure of Science," Robert 
Merton (1948) writes that the singular object of science, its raison 
d'etre, is the "pursuit and diffusion of knowledge" (4). 
Furthermore, the specialized methods and knowledge base that 
distinguish the scientific enterprise rest upon a delicate web of 
explicit and implicit understandings. Merton describes how the 
"Ethos of Science" is legitimated in the observance of four 
conditions. These conditions stipulate that scientific inquiry 
should be: (1) neutral; (2) commonly owned (i.e., "ownership" is 
limited to claims of intellectual authorship); (3) disinterested¬ 
ness; and (4) subject to detached scrutiny. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH PROCEDURES: Q METHODOLOGY - 
OPERATIONALIZING SUBJECTIVITY 
Only subjective opinions are at issue in Q, and although they are 
typically improvable, they can nonetheless be shown to have structure 
an<^ form, and it is the task of Q technique to render this form manifest 
for purposes of observation and study. 
Brown, 1986 
Introduction 
This research has three interrelated objectives. One, to survey 
the perspectives of selected humanities and science faculty regarding 
the current status of the social relations of academic research. In the 
main, the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist debate represents the opinion 
of leading academic scientists, university administrators, corporate 
spokesmen. Working faculty constitute the missing voice. Where, in 
effect, do various faculty draw their lines? Second, the perspectives 
rendered by faculty are compared with (a) the bipolar conceptual 
dimension indexing the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist discourse and (b) 
the competing ontologies shaping the concentric theoretical model 
formulated in Chapter 2. Are historians pure Traditionalists and 
science faculty Instrumentalists? Or, will faculty opinion organize 
around mixed or altogether novel frames of reference? Do these models, 
in other words, adequately describe the phenomena they purport to 
represent? 
And not least, can a mechanism be found to represent the ontology 
of organizational boundary? For the exploratory purposes of this study, 
will Q Methodology (Stephensen, 1953; Brown, 1980; McKeown & Thomas, 
1988) capture the variety, ambiguity and contradiction - as well as the 
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regularity - purportedly endemic to the social relations of academic 
work? 
Since this project attempts to explore the frameworks of meaning 
respective science and humanities faculty draw on to construct the 
permissible limits of academic practice, some methodological concerns 
deserve special attention. The empathic "in-the-other-person's-shoes" 
axiom (Weber's verstehen sociology) behind all interpretive research 
warrants method that is patient, sensitive to variety and ambiguity 
(Smircich, 1983), and unobtrusive (Brown, 1986). In operative terms, 
the investigator's operating hypotheses and method of choice must not 
subordinate the subject's level of experience. Otherwise, we chance 
reducing the phenomenon of interest to the model's Procrustean 
specifications (Stephensen, 1983; Daly, 1991) by "elevating the 
imagination into the status of a universal legislator" (Graff, 1979). 
Given that the exploratory interest here is not to extend the range of 
phenomena explicable in the analyst's terms so much as to map the 
subjective terrain of meanings of a particular discourse, Q Methodology 
seemed to bring an epistemological orientation and "operational 
substance" (Brown & Mathieson, 1990) particularly suited for this 
exploratory task (Stephenson, 1953; Brown, 1981; McKeown & Thomas, 
1988).1 
0 Methodology 
Q Methodology (Q) assumes from the very start that subjective 
phenomena are not arbitrary nor intangible, but in possession of 
discernable form. However, the structure of subjective cognitive and 
evaluative categories can be empirically known only if meanings are 
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articulated in the respondents' terms. Subjective meaning in Q, 
moreover, is not free-floating and/or self-contained, but meaningful in 
relation to social and intra-subjective environment. In Q, as in other 
phenomenological approaches, the pieces of the jig-saw puzzle find 
significance in relation to the whole (Steele, 1979). 
Accordingly, unlike "R" (Pearson's correlation R) method, Q 
research does not take standardized statements (e.g., scales, traits) at 
face value (that variables measure what they purport to measure), but 
attempts to express a hermeneutic reconstruction. Subject response is 
not assumed analogous, therefore, to the categorical meanings invented 
by the investigator in absentia. For example, the meaning of a disputed 
term like "alienation" is not taken as fixed - equivalent, as Brown 
(1986) puts it, to a degree of Celsius. Fixed meanings are customary in 
R because it is important to learn how much of a selected attribute 
(authoritarianism, liberalism, alienation, etc.) someone has. In Q, the 
subject's view on the matter comes first. 
Meaning and measurement in Q, therefore, are not mediated as 
material "things" external to and independent of the respondent. To the 
contrary, Q assumes that "reality" is "caused" by individuals and not by 
"variables" standing in for some external reality. In a word, research 
categories in Q are not the a priori products of the investigator's 
"arbitrary subjectivity," but made phenomenologically operant by 
respondents communicating for themselves (McKeown & Thomas, 1988). 
Procedure 
Data are gathered in Q Methodology by having subjects sort cards 
containing words, concepts, statements or images being explored in the 
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T£- 
i-Tjectis assemr^e the various cards into piles according to 
dr zvz sense cf similarity or difference with the contents on the 
-- The result consists of distributions of cards codifying each 
subject s interpretation of the phenomenon being studied. In turn, card 
distributions (i.e. . sorts'* can be analyzed and compared along with the 
s_d j ects thems eIves. 
For this study a final Q sample of 66 statements was selected and 
presented tc 31 faculty (14 historians and 17 polymer scientists and 
engineers at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst) . Starting with 
department chairmen and senior faculty, subjects were solicited for 
their participation in this study through personal visits to various 
faculty offices, telephone calls, and written memoranda. The final 
departmental cohorts represent an attempt to obtain roughly similar 
dispersions of faculty by age, gender and rank. 
In the investigator's presence, all 31 subjects received identical 
instructions to rank issue statements (each typed on a 3 X 5 card) along 
a forced choice continuum from "most like my point of view" (+5) to 
those "most unlike my point of view" (-5). The resultant scale value 
and requested number of cards per cell are shown in Figure 4.1, below: 
Most Unlike -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 Most Like 
Cards (4) (5) (5) (7) (7) (10)(7) (7) (5) (5) (4) per cell 
Figure 4.1 
Scale Values and Cards per Cell 
Each subject was initially instructed to separate the entire deck 
of statements into three piles: those most like your point of view, 
those most unlike your point of view and those statements with little 
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psychological value (Brown, 1972). Respondents then selected four 
statements from the "most like" pile and placed them in cell +5. Each 
subject then selected four cards from the "most unlike" pile and placed 
them in the -5 cell. This was followed by selecting the next five "most 
like" statements for cell +4 and so forth in a back-and-forth mode until 
all 66 statements were situated along the opinion continuum. 
To illustrate, the resulting Q sort for one subject (number 8) is 
displayed in Figure 4.2, below: 
Most Unlike 
Card number 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
40 50 2 36 44 38 58 31 30 40 39 
5 15 1 8 66 48 9 13 33 54 32 
53 65 64 28 6 7 43 56 55 23 17 
4 61 59 26 19 21 3 12 27 49 29 
16 11 25 10 23 37 57 52 14 
41 60 46 63 47 
35 18 62 51 22 
42 45 34 
Most Like 
Figure 4.2 
Sample Q Sort 
The 31 Q sorts were correlated producing a 31 x 31 correlation 
matrix with coefficients indicating the degree of similarity between 
each Q sort and all others. The matrix was then factor-analyzed using 
the principal components method. The factors extracted were rotated 
(using varimax) to a position of simplest structure. 
Q and R 
A major stumbling block to comprehending the logic of Q is that 
most of us have been trained to think in terms of the mechanics and 
authority of "R". Perhaps the theoretical orthogonality (not to be 
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mistaken for bipolarity) of Q and R can be effectively illustrated by 
referring to the familiar linear correlation formula (Pedhazur, 1973): 
Y - a + bx + E 
where Y - the independent variable; X - the dependent variable; a(lpha) 
- the Y intercept; B(eta) - the regression coefficient; and E - random 
disturbance or error term. 
The epistemological gap differentiating Q from R becomes evident 
if we examine the way each treats the E term. Because achieving 
statistical significance is accomplished by smoothing individual 
differences of subjects in R, (subjective) meaning is deemed 
idiosyncratic and theoretically controlled by the error term. With 
respondent subjectivity amputated from context, the error term in R acts 
to signify methodological detachment as well as the privileged position 
of the investigator's interpretive schema. Indeed, R validity and 
reliability are grounded in the autonomous and self-referential 
conditions symbolized by E. In theory, systematic variance is 
"impartially" explained in R by isolating meaning from impersonal, non- 
contentious fact. 
Q's relatively spacious, discretionary logic can be disconcerting 
particularly for those accustomed to thinking in R, because meaning is 
not a problem in Q. Rather than working to eliminate the E term, Q 
purposefully strives to make subjective significance the center of 
theoretical and technical interest. That is, Q (opinion) and R (fact) 
work from different sets of data (Brown, 1985). Since Q validity hinges 
on the context of the respondent's hermeneutic narrative rather than 
"externally" Imposed meanings, Q attempts to pry open the black box 
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measures symbolized by E. Because subjective rather than "objective" 
are seminal in Q, the investigator and respondent share epistemologic 
authority. 
In sum, the Q analyst's objective is not to find phenomena that 
neatly fit into preconceived conceptual categories for the purposes of 
prediction and testing, but to locate and map a natural conceptual 
topography. The analyst and respondent in Q collaborate to preserve the 
respondent's voice ("operationalizing" subjectivity) in order to map the 
aggregate mix of opinion constituting a particular "concourse" 
(discourse) of research interest (Brown, 1986). Q's particular 
contribution is its capacity to organize and reduce data in order to 
clarify the underlying theoretical constructs that might be employed as 
leading operational categories in subsequent descriptive or 
correlational analyses (Norusis, 1988), or ethnographic research. 
Although Q and R view the ontological status of phenomena from 
quite different perspectives, the investigator is not necessarily 
trapped into an either/or choice. It is perhaps more constructive to 
think of Q as a source point for R (Brown, 1980). In effect, Q 
functions as a conceptual staging area generating heuristic leads for 
the subsequent correlational or qualitative analyses that may follow. 
If the meaning of the role and activities of research schools is 
changing in the minds of interested parties, then Q offers a systematic 
empirical method midway between positivist and ideographic approaches 
for surveying the new lines along which the reading of universities is 
occurring. 
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Considering that the concepts and mechanics of Q methodology may 
be unfamiliar to some readers each of the technical steps outlined above 
is discussed in more detail in the sections that follow. 
Q Statements 
To examine the competing contentions of the Traditionalists and 
Instrumentalists, a final representative sample of 66 Q statements was 
drawn from over 400 statements derived from the investigator's deductive 
reading of the literature (see Figure 3.1). Secondary source material 
included journal and newspaper articles, government publications, books, 
and congressional testimony. 
In light of the sheer volume of statements (400+) harvested, the 
first priority was to trim this number down to practical size. Many of 
the original statements were redundant and consequently dropped. 
Further reductions were achieved after a sample of the remaining 
statements was cross-validated by two independent reviewers. Statements 
determined to be ambiguous or duplicative were eliminated. 
Q-Sample Pretest 
A Q-sample of 79 statements was coded and printed on 3 x 5 cards 
for pretesting. Twelve graduate (Ph.D) students (four each from the 
departments of Economics, History and Polymer Science & Engineering) 
participated. Subjects were instructed to sort the 79 statements along 
a (-5) "most unlike my point of view" to (+5) "most like my point of 
view" choice continuum. On average, students required about 70 minutes 
to complete the 79 card Q-sort. 
To examine how students were sorting, two iterations of Principal 
Components factor analysis were performed; once on the complete 12 
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subject sample and a second time with the four economic students 
excluded. (The economics students were dropped from the second analysis 
because the final subject sample enlisted History and Polymer Science & 
Engineering faculty only.) 
The 12 subject analysis produced two factors with eigenvalues of 
5.55 and 1.26. These two factors accounted for a cumulative 56.8% of 
variance. Factors did not undergo substantive modification with 
rotation indicating strong factor structures. The eight subject sample 
also produced two strong factors with eigenvalues of 3.60 and 1.11 
respectively. Cumulative variance explained rose to 59%. The factor 
structures for both analyses indicated that pretest subjects were not 
sorting randomly. In other words, the statements were sufficiently 
meaningful for the test subjects to categorize statements in a 
systematic manner. Since the purpose of the Q statements is to elicit a 
strong positive or negative response, statements consistently assigned 
to low to neutral meaning cells eg. -1, 0, and +1 were trimmed, reducing 
the final Q-sort to 66 cards. 
In the end, the Q sample administered to the faculty sample 
numbered 66 statements divided in near equal proportion between 
Traditionalist (non-economic) and Instrumentalist (economic) attitudes. 
In addition, statements covered nine issue areas: (1) collectivity (2 
statements), (2) intellectual property (11 statements), (3) faculty 
entrepreneurism (6 statements), (4) disinterestedness (15 statements), 
(5) project choice and work design (3 statements), (6) the organization 
of work (2 statements), (7) quality control (4 statements), (8) reward 
system (2 statements), and (9) faculty and student recruitment (2 
statements). (Consult the schema of conceptual categories displayed in 
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Figure 3.1, page 53). A complete 66 card inventory of statements can be 
found in Appendix B. 
Statements representative of each main effect (the non-economic 
[category 1] and economic [category 2]) as well as the normative and 
structural sub-categories resonating from each were selected in 
approximately equal numbers. It was decided, for example, that the 
following statement represented the University as a Non-Economic 
Institution (classical Traditionalist in Figure 3.1): 
Expensive, well-publicized corporate/university partnerships 
are dangerous not only for the threats they pose to the 
traditions of academic science, but because other 
institutions will use these instances as "models" of the way 
university-industry agreements ought to be. 
The University as an Economic Institution (Instrumentalist in Figure 
3.1) orientation was reflected in the following example: 
A more applied orientation will be good for American 
university science, reducing the academic isolation that 
developed during earlier postwar periods. 
A Traditionalist Intellectual Property position is expressed in the 
following statement: 
The only "property rights" allowable for scientific 
discoveries are the scientific honors and rewards that 
derive from recognition of their originator. 
Whereas, an opposed (Instrumentalist) Intellectual Property opinion 
reads as follows: 
Some infringements of the university's principle of free 
dissemination of information should be allowed on a case by 
case basis in order to protect the university's financial 
interest. 
Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis in Q is a straightforward statistical exercise for 
unearthing the various attitudinal groupings implicit in the correlation 
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matrix. Each factor in Q represents a category of operant subjectivity; 
i.e., persons significantly associated ("loaded") with a given factor 
are assumed to share a common outlook. Thus, an individual's positive 
loading on a factor indicates his or her shared subjectivity with others 
on that factor. Conversely, negative loadings are signs of rejection of 
the factor's perspective. The portfolio of factors that ultimately 
emerges depends on how divided an audience is on a particular issue. 
Factor Interpretation 
The previous steps are requisite "to prepare(ing) phenomena so 
that they can display their structure" (Brown, 1985: 115). And this 
implicit structure resides in the "patterned relationships" of 
statements made operant by individuals performing Q sorts. Each factor, 
then, represents a generalized attitude or Gestalt or, as in this case, 
a general conception of "the ethos of academic life" held in common by 
the persons grouped by factor. 
While it is axiomatic that "order" precede "meaning" in Q, Q 
factors never lose their "fundamentally operant" and provocative nature. 
Unlike R, therefore, the process of factor interpretation, commences 
only after factors surface and remains open to further testing and 
reevaluation (Brown, 1986). 
With Q, factor descriptions and interpretations are based 
primarily on factor scores (and factor loadings) (McKeown & Thomas, 
1988). Examining the factor scores of selected statement items across 
factors assists in the search for the basic themes distinguishing the 
internal perspectives of important factors. To facilitate this process, 
the factor scores assigned to each individual statement are merged into 
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distinct factor arrays which function as composite Q-sorts for each 
factor. Arrays are typically placed side by side for viewing and 
analysis. Differences and similarities in factor scores by statement 
item provide the basis for description and theorizing (Brown, 1980). 
Factor scores were calculated in standard (Z) score units for each 
of the 66 statements and then arrayed in columns by factor. For 
convenience Z scores were converted into whole numbers (-5, -4, -3, -4 
...+4, +5) to simplify comparisons of the thematic content of different 
factor arrays. For illustrative purposes, partial arrays are shown in 
Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 
Examples of Statement Factor Scores Arrayed by Factor2 
Statement # Factor A Scores Factor B Scores 
1 +1 -1 
2 +2 -1 
3 +3 +5 
4 +3 0 
5 +2 -1 
6 +1 +2 
7 +1 +2 
8 +3 +1 
9 +1 +4 
10 +2 0 
66 +5 +3 
Table 4.1 table shows the composite factor scores for the Q- 
statements shown. Statement 1, for example, failed to excite subject 
interest in either factor. Statement 3, on the other hand, induced 
stronger responses (+3 and +5). Every statement for each factor's 
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composite array is scored in this manner making intra- and inter-factor 
comparisons possible. 
P-Sample 
The selection of appropriate questions and subjects constitutes 
the two most important procedural aspects of any Q study. Since the 
exploratory purpose of Q research is not concerned with assigning 
subjects to predetermined categories, but mapping the typology of 
opinion implicit in the communication discourse in question, neither 
randomness nor large sample size are material. The size and composition 
of person (P) samples is governed exclusively by pragmatic and 
theoretical concerns (McKeown & Thomas, 1988). 
In light of the binary theoretical dimensions segmenting the 
literature, subjects were recruited from two disciplines (History - 14 
members, and Polymer Science & Engineering - 17 members) hypothesized to 
represent bipolar opinions (humanities vs. hard science) concerning 
university/industry relations. The idea of a science/humanities break 
is not new, of course. In his influential book, The Two Cultures and 
the Scientific Revolution (1959), C. P. Snow describes university 
environments as consisting of two powerful sub-cultures - one occupied 
by scientists and the other by literary intellectuals. Viewing the 
world in radically different terms, each remains isolated from the 
other. Weber, too, partitioned the cultural world into three distinct 
spheres - science, morality (eg., law and medicine), and art. [See 
Richard J. Bernstein (ed.), Habermas and Modernity (1985).] 
In other words, the intention here was to examine the major 
conceptual features of the Traditionalist/Instrumentalist antithesis and 
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organizational theory with faculty operating at the boundary, i.e., 
those whose work required regular and extensive contact with industry 
(polymer scientists), and another set nearer to the "core", i.e., 
faculty with virtually no market exposure at all (historians). 
Although it might be perceived otherwise by readers accustomed to 
random sampling modes, this qualitative (nonrandom) sampling strategy 
actually entails no assurance that Traditionalist and Instrumentalist 
positions would materialize as hypothesized. On the contrary, like 
other forms of inquiry, results could not be controlled for (known) in 
advance, only conceptually anticipated. Logic anticipated different 
perspectives, but the risk of coming up (empirically) empty handed was 
real. For example, the analytic reading of the literature might have 
been incomplete. Or, even if our deductive analysis of the 
Traditionalist/Instrumentalist literature was acknowledged as valid 
there was no way to know in advance if faculty constituted their world 
in Traditionalist/Instrumentalist terms. Everything considered, 
sampling faculty from the alleged classical intellectual divide embodied 
in the humanities and the hard sciences seemed to constitute a 
reasonable test. Participants were also asked to complete a brief 
background questionnaire. Some of these demographic data appear later. 
The Two Departments and Their Relations with Industry 
Both departments are recognized in their respective fields. The 
History department dates back to the university's founding in 1863 and 
currently hosts 40 full-time tenured or tenure track members. Faculty 
engage in teaching and research in a variety of areas including Ancient, 
Middle Eastern, and Latin and North American history, Labor Studies, 
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Black and Feminist history, studies in Western Technology, etc. 
Departmental (salary) expenditures amounted to $1,919,121 for FY 1990 
(source: Dept, of History). The department received one direct 
(humanities) foundation grant for $1469 in FY 1991 (source: Office of 
Grants and Contracts). Not unexpectedly, the faculty surveyed in this 
study hold no patents, with one exception do not advise industry (and 
not for profit); and besides book royalties, derive no direct monetary 
support from industry. 
If the History department is unique for its low level of grant 
support, the Polymer Science and Engineering Program functions in a 
radically different arena. Launched as a modest graduate program in 
1967, the PSE Department expanded into a university department in 1974. 
Currently, PSE operates with 13 full time and several adjunct 
interdisciplinary faculty with over 150 graduate students and visiting 
scientists in residence (Polymer Symposium. May 16, 1991). Research 
experience in industry for senior faculty averaged seven years. Over 50 
companies and several government agencies support research and advanced 
degree programs. In FY 90-91 the department received a little under $1M 
(salaries) from the state and $7,571,200 in direct and indirect grants 
from the National Science Foundation (24%), Department of Defense 
(39.4%) and industry (36.6%) (Polymer Symposium. May 16, 1991). In 
addition, the department signed a three-year, $1,200,000 research 
contract with AKZO America and a $2M five-year deal with IBM. PSE will 
officially come of age when it moves to its new $57M, 160,000 square 
foot headquarters, the Conte Polymer Research Center, in April, 1994. 
Over and above state support, the department maintains six major 
funding programs for underwriting its research and teaching activities. 
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The Center for UMass-Industry Research on Polymers (CUMIRP) is the most 
prominent of these programs and of particular interest to this research 
- 16 of the 17 scientists surveyed are active members of CUMIRP. 
Inaugurated in September, 1980, under the NSF Industry-University 
Cooperative Research Center Program, the official goal of CUMIRP "is to 
develop a sound research base in key areas of polymer science of 
interest to industry participants" (Graduate Program in Polymer Science 
& Engineering. 1989). Twelve industry and two government agencies 
underwrite CUMIRP research. Membership fees are currently fixed at 
$40,000 per year. Recent sponsors included AKZO, American Cyanamid, 
Hoeschst-Celanese, Dow, DuPont, Eastman Kodak Co., General Electric, 
IBM, Olin, Rohm & Haas, Army Laboratories, Natick and Watertown, Mass., 
and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, Calif. The 
National Science Foundation is a member on a continuing basis. In 
addition, the NSF contributes another $93,000 in support of four smaller 
projects boosting the total 1990-91 CUMIRP budget to $693,000 
(conversation with Dr. S. W. Kantor, Director, CUMIRP). The 1991-92 
budget projection is $823,200. (However, this estimate faces some 
obstacles. At this time, 12 contracts are slated for renewal. In 
addition, one company recently cancelled its membership as part of a 
cost-cutting effort.) 
CUMIRP membership entitles sponsors to non-exclusive, royalty-free 
U.S. and foreign licenses to CUMIRP inventions. Patent rights remain 
the property of the university, however. Participating faculty have the 
right to publish in scientific journals, but sponsors may review 
manuscripts beforehand. Although no patents have been filed to date, 
sponsors interested in filing patent claims may delay publication up to 
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one year. Ax\ Advisory Board composed of members fro« indust iv and the 
University meets semi-annually to decide and approve policy and \e*ea\ch 
projects. 
Facultv ?enccrarhcs 
The faculty sample comprised thirty-one (31) full-time faculty at 
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst - 14 History faculty and 1/ 
members of the Polymer Science and Engineering department. The mean a^e 
of the faculty sampled was 49 years (32 to 69 years). Research and 
teaching experience averaged 16.5 years (1 to 40 years). Twenty-tom 
(24) faculty were tenured (associate rank or senior). 
The 14 history faculty averaged 48.5 years of age and 16.7 years 
of teaching and research experience. Five faculty in this group were 
women. Nine faculty were tenured. No subject in the history cohort had 
filed for a patent claim, had sat on a corporate advisory board, or had 
received any research support from industry during their academic 
careers. 
On average, polymer science subjects were likely to be 49 years 
old with 16.2 years of academic experience. Fifteen (15) out of 
seventeen (17) were tenured. There were no women faculty in the 
department at the time of this study. Seven faculty owned patents, ten 
had or were currently sitting on corporate advisory boards, and 37.5 per 
cent of this cohort's research and teaching activities was underwritten 
by industry. Industrial research experience for the most senior faculty 
averaged seven years. 
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End Notes 
1. In addition, the charged atmosphere surrounding the issue of 
university-industry relations also influenced our choice of 
methodology. If possible, we wanted to avoid the complaint of 
self-reporting bias clouding the credibility of earlier 
questionnaire research (see Krimsky, Ennis, & Weissman, 1991). As 
compared to these approaches, the process of Q-sorting seems to 
provide subjects with the requisite level of privacy and anonymity 
for dealing with sensitive subject matter. 
2. The factor scores are the same scale numbers as they appear in the 
forced choice continuum organizing every Q sort, i.e., 
Most Unlike -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 Most Like. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The factors in Q methodology are categories of operant 
suh iectivity (Stephenson, 1977) that were inherent in the concourse 
originally, for it was these separate attitudes (the existence of which 
the factor analysis demonstrates) that gave rise to all the conversation 
initially. What begins as subjective communicability, therefore, is 
prepared for viewing through "the midwifery of Q methodology," as 
Barchak (1984: 118) has nicely put it, and is eventually manifested as 
operant factors, which, in turn, display the form and structure of the 
communicability at issue. 
Brown (1986) 
Introduction 
Q methodology assumes that underlying subjective structures can be 
made manifest or "operant" by providing respondents an unobtrusive 
medium to model their respective points of view. Accordingly, faculty 
Q-sorts are analyzed in this chapter in an attempt to literally 
visualize how faculty "see" their organizational experiences firsthand. 
Following the procedure outlined in the previous chapter, 31 faculty 
subjects modelled their subjectivity by rank ordering (Q-sorting) 66 
statements along a continuum of interest. All 31 Q-sorts were 
intercorrelated resulting in a 31 x 31 correlation matrix. Factor 
analysis was then carried out. 
The factor solution produced two major factors, A and B - two 
distinct (uncorrelated) clusters of opinion with 17 respondents 
significantly identified with one factor or the other (see Tables 5.1 
and 5.2). Each stood out with regard to relative eigenvalue scores, 
variance explained and variable (subject) size. Both factors A and B 
displayed eigenvalues (EV) well in excess of the conventional threshold 
of 1.00, ie., EV - 8.046 and 6.58, respectively. In addition, factor A 
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Table 5.1 
Factor Loadings and Subjects 
(H - Historian; P - Polymer Scientist/Engineer) 
Factor A B C D E 
Subj ect H12 .867 P17 .751 PI .720 P8 .856 P2 .698 
H14 .854 P16 .722 H7 .691 P15 .472 Pll .670 
HI .799 P10 .698 P12 .652 P3 .545 
H5 .791 P4 .636 
H4 .777 P6 .604 
H6 .768 P9 .516 
H9 .739 P14 .418 
H2 .636 
H10 .636 
Hll .592 
EV = 8 .05 6 .58 1.64 1.58 1.28 
%Variance 26 21 5.3 5.1 4.1 
Factor F G H 
Subject H3 .814 P13 .722 H8 .683 
H13 .568 P5 .574 P7 -.392 
EV - 1 .17 1 .06 1.03 
%Variance 3.8 3.4 3.3 
accounted for twenty-six (26) percent of total variability explained. 
Factor B accounted for 21 percent for a cumulative percentage of 47.2 
percent. Factor loadings for each factor are significant at the 0.01 
level.1 
Even at this early juncture the factor analysis yields four 
tentative leads. One, the two principal factors, A and B, are split 
along departmental lines. A plurality of historians and polymer 
scientists and engineers have Q-sorted orthogonal perspectives. Second, 
the appearance of composite (homeless) subjects such as P14 and P7 as 
well as the six residual factors signals the possibility of categories 
other than the pure, two-dimensional (Traditionalist/Instrumentalist) 
types featured in the literature. (Subject P14 loads virtually equally 
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on factor A (.39) and factor B (.42). P7 displays equivalent 
associations across factors A (.37), C (.34), D (.34).) Third, among 
other things, the presence of the six residual factors demonstrates the 
presence of within-discipline divisions (i.e., not all historians think 
alike). And last, generation, and gender, have emerged as possible 
issues for future inquiry. (For more commentary regarding gender and 
generation turn to Appendix D.) 
Interpretation 
The analyst works with many degrees of freedom in Q Methodology. 
As Brown (1985: 113) explains, Q is: 
...expressly devoid of normative presumptions, and hence 
there is no standard set of Q items for any study, no 
standardized statements, no standard number of statements, 
no fixed number of factors, no fixed algorithm for factor 
rotation (e.g., varimax), and no standard distribution. 
The same degree of flexibility applies to factor interpretation as well. 
If the analysis is to accomplish more than mere description, the 
investigator has to be prepared to slip into the respondents' shoes 
(Brown, 1989). "Empathy” is achieved when the investigator learns to 
think what the Q-sorters were thinking and in their terms. 
Typically, the literature provides no clear criteria for gaining 
hermeneutic entrance. The investigator is essentially left on his or 
her own. If the Q literature provides any clue at all it is that 
analysts customarily attack the problem of interpretation in part or all 
of the following ways. Depending on what the investigator is trying to 
accomplish, inferences can be drawn from consensual or negatively 
consensual statements (Vajirakachorn & Sylvia, [1990]), from statements 
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located at the extremes of composite Q-sort distributions (the 
statements found under the +5 and -5 cells) (Brown & Mathieson [1990]), 
by scanning for comparisons across factor arrays (Patterson, 1982), or, 
as we have decided to do here, by employing all of these strategies. 
Brown (1986) customarily embarks on his interpretive process by 
applying Stephenson's (1983) "Sontag" rule. He spreads every statement 
constituting each factor's composite attitude (Q-sort) out for viewing 
and then strives to "see more, hear more, feel more" of what each factor 
expresses before deliberately interpreting the impressions that emerge 
from this intuitive process. We will honor his example with a 
preliminary visual survey of the entire (66 card) Q-sort distribution. 
However, not unmindful of the general interpretive context rendered in 
the 66 card display, we find the thought of grappling with the entire 
deck visually and analytically overwhelming. We risk missing something 
important. 
We propose that a richer understanding can be gained by 
subdividing the deck into more manageable-sized categories. The cards 
in each category are then organized into display maps for purposes of 
visualization and interpretation. Indeed, most Q investigators proceed 
in an incremental manner. Only in this instance we intend to rake 
through the data a little more finely and incrementally than most. If, 
as Brown claims (1986), seeing precedes hearing and feeling, then 
hopefully, the extraordinary emphasis on visual mapping used here will 
create a window to the patterns implicit in the data, thus rendering 
them visible. So, following Brown's (1986) recommendation, the 
respective Q-sorts for Factors A and B are arrayed in Tables 5.3 and 
5.4. 
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Table 5.32 
Distribution of Factor A Statements 
(Historians Only) 
Most Unlike Most Like 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
2.6 3.9 2.9 3.10 2.2 2.10 1.1 1.2 1.3 3.6 4.9 
4.8 4.2 3.14 2.5 4.1 1.6 1.5 1.4 9.7 8.3 
6.3 4.6 3.16 2.11 5.11 1.7 1.10 1.8 11.2 
11.1 5.4 4.4 2.14 9.3 1.9 3.7 1.11 
7.1 4.7 3.5 2.3 3.8 3.4 
4.10 3.11 3.2 4.3 3.12 
4.15 5.1 3.13 5.7 3.15 
6.2 10.2 3.17 5.9 4.5 
9.1 9.5 7.2 5.5 
7.4 8.5 
10.5 
Table 5.4 
Distribution of Factor B 
(Polymer Scientists 
Statements3 
Only) 
Most Unlike Most Like 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
11.1 2.6 3.17 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.6 2.11 1.9 1.3 
4.6 4.1 1.2 1.10 3.8 1.7 3.4 2.3 2.5 
9.1 1.5 1.11 3.9 2.9 3.6 3.12 2.10 
10.2 3.7 2.2 5.1 4.2 3.10 4.15 2.14 
5.9 7.4 6.3 4.5 3.13 5.4 3.2 
9.7 9.5 4.9 3.14 7.2 3.5 
10.5 8.5 3.16 3.11 
9.3 4.3 3.15 
11.2 4.4 
4.7 
4.8 
4.10 
5.5 
5.7 
5.11 
6.2 
7.1 
8.3 
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Discussion of Complete (66) Card Distributions bv Major Factors A & R 
What do these patterns initially suggest? Broadly speaking, the 
composite configurations of card placements for each factor show that 
Factor A statements are fairly evenly divided between negative and 
positive attributions; whereas, Factor B statement placement is heavily 
skewed toward the positive ("most like") side of the sort. Indeed, the 
+5 cell in Factor B contains 18 statement items, twice as many as any of 
the other cells in that factor. By comparison, the +5 cell in Factor A 
contains only three items. As a group, the historians (Factor A) placed 
a total of five cards in cells +4 and +5, while the polymer scientists 
placed nearly five times as many or 24. If the most polar cells are 
indicators of the level of respondent interest then these different 
patterns suggest that the polymer scientists are more strongly moved by 
the cards on the whole than their historian counterparts. Perhaps the 
historians' relatively cool response is due to the fact that their 
concerns are different or not as immediate as the polymer science 
faculty. Indeed, after sorting statements some historians commented 
that they placed a large number of statements in the -1, 0, and +1 cells 
because many of the issues in the Q-sample were unfamiliar to them. 
Are there any clues regarding Traditionalist or Instrumentalist 
values to be found in these sorts? Leaving the analysis of the 
statement contents until later, let's try to facilitate visualization of 
tentative patterns by purging each composite Q-sort of everything but 
two categories of statements - non-economic (Traditionalist) items 
(coded category 1) and economic (Instrumentalist) items (category 2) and 
"see" what comes to mind (Tables 5.5 and 5.6). 
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Table 5.5 
Distribution of Non-Economic (Category 1) - "Traditionalist" and 
Economic - "Instrumentalist" (Category 2) Statements in Factor A 
(Historians) 
Most Unlike 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
2.6 2.9 2.2 2.10 1.1 1.2 1.3 
2.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 
2.11 1.7 1.10 1.8 
2.14 1.9 1.11 
2.3 
Table 5.6 
Most Like 
+4 +5 
Distribution of Non-Economic (Category 1) - "Traditionalist" and 
Economic (Category 2) - "Instrumentalist" Statements in Factor B 
(Polymer Scientists) 
Most Unlike Most Like 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
2.6 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.6 2.11 1.9 1.3 
1.2 1.10 1.7 2.3 2.5 
1.11 2.9 2.10 
2.2 2.14 
Discussion of Category 1 and Category 
2 Statement Distributions by Faculty Cohorts 
The distribution of category 1 and category 2 statements should 
provide a provisional index of how strongly "Traditional" or 
"Instrumental" each factor is weighted. First notice that all of the 
category 1 statements in Factor A are situated to the right of "0" or in 
the positive spectrum of that factor. All the category 2 statements, 
conversely, are located to the left of zero (save for one item at the 
midpoint [2.10] and another under the +1 cell [2.3]). Moreover, the 
Traditionalist statements (category 1) are concentrated in cells +1 
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through +3. Interestingly, cells +4 and +5 are vacant. This may 
indicate that the sample of history faculty is not as firmly wedded to 
Traditionalist values as originally hypothesized. The modified polymer 
factor (Factor B) Q-sort is also provocative. For example, cards from 
both categories are virtually evenly divided (five category 1 items and 
six category 2 items) between cell +1 to cell +5, although twice as many 
category 2 items (four to two) are found in the +4 and +5 cells. As 
shown, five category 1 statements occupy the 0 and -1 cells and one 
outlying category 2 item languishes in the -3 cell. Again without 
having examined any statement contents, this pattern may suggest a 
significant degree of ambivalence. Although the polymer scientists in 
Factor B lean toward the Instrumentalist perspective, they seem to 
represent a value mix rather than a pure type. 
What do these first impressions suggest? At this superficial 
level, at least, the Q instrument appears sensitive to variety and 
ambivalence. That is, it demonstrates, if only tentatively at this 
point, a capacity to probe beneath crude univocal categories. Second, 
the preliminary findings hint that historian and polymer science cohorts 
operate with different value systems. Third, the possible presence of a 
diversity of academic norms and values weakens the unitary (structural¬ 
ist) theory of organization assumed in the Traditionalist and 
Instrumentalist literatures. Indeed, the discovery of two orthogonal 
factors clearly indicates that faculty do not speak with one voice on 
these issues. 
Some areas of agreement exist, however. For example, both factors 
pay tribute to several Mertonian norms (category 1 statements) and 
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reject statement 2.6. Perhaps these (departmental) distributions 
suggest that while "Traditionalist" and "Instrumentalist" categories may 
exist, they are more complex than the literature allows for. 
Before considering factors A and B individually, it may be 
instructive to examine the opinions common to both factors - those 16 
statements that gained essentially the same score across both factors.4 
Let's examine the most positively consensual statements along with their 
factor scores arranged from the most positively salient down (Table 
5.7). 
Table 5.7 
Distribution of positively consensual statements in 
Factors A and B (Factor A statements in parens) 
Most Unlike 
-5 -4 -3 -2 
Most Like 
+1 +2 +3 +4 
(1.6) 1.6 
(1.7) 1.7 
3.8 (3.8) 3.4 
3.6 (3.6) 
(3.12) 3.12 
(4.3) 4.3 
4.5 (4.5) 
8.5 (8.5) 
9.5 8.3 
(9.5) (8.3) 
List of Positively Consensual Statements with Factor Scores 
8.3 Market forces have always been a part of the shifts Scores 
among posts in U.S. academia, but now the scale has A B 
dramatically altered their significance. These +5 +5 
have created rifts within the faculties of each 
institution; the humanities and social science 
faculties often feel that they are being neglected. 
3.6 The pattern of collaboration between large uni- +4 +3 
versities and large corporations may be a familiar 
one. But the implications for the use of taxpayers' 
funds and the danger of conflicts of interest that 
these agreements raise require renewed evaluation. 
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3.12 Universities should also be worried about "con- +3 
flicts of commitment" - situations where faculty 
members neglect their academic duties in favor of 
pursuing other activities, such as consulting 
outside the university. 
3.4 Scientists who shift their attention to the +3 
economic benefits of research or who hold equity 
in firms that market scientific discoveries cannot, 
at the same time, serve society as disinterested 
experts on the impacts of the new scientific 
technologies. 
4.3 The unwillingness of academic researchers supported +2 
by industry to make research results public will 
slow the research process of colleagues. 
4.5 Science is nourished by free and open exchanges +3 
of information. There is no place for proprietary 
knowledge in the academy. 
8.5 There are bound to be adverse consequences in terms +3 
of collaboration among faculty in various depart¬ 
ments if one group must worry about protecting 
corporate rights to licenses. 
1.6 The question for the '90s is whether universities +1 
are to be public-sector institutions spending 
public money or private-sector institutions 
supported with public money. 
1.7 It's always a mistake to reduce support for funda- +1 
mental science in order to address things you may 
think have more immediate applications. 
3.8 Researchers should pledge that, while a study is +2 
in progress, they will not hold stock in the 
companies making or distributing the products 
being evaluated. 
9.5 Given industry's investment in university research, +1 
it's not surprising that industry should want to 
extend its control into the "untouchable" area of 
peer review. 
+4 
+3 
+3 
+2 
+2 
+2 
+2 
+1 
+1 
Discussion of Positively Consensual Statements 
Notice that each of these statements endorses the non-economic 
values of classical, Mertonian science - disinterestedness (3.8, 3.4, 
3.12), free exchange (4.3, 4.5), the pre-eminence of a collective ethos 
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(8.5, 8.3). But these statements also carry an undertone of concern - 
of trespass? - that orthodox values are at risk of being overrun by 
antithetical market values (8.3, 3.6, 9.5). Both factors seem to share 
a concern about the emphasis of current events. Will too much emphasis 
on market priorities, for example, result in a deemphasis on basic 
research (1.7), deepen the alleged rift between science and humanities 
faculty (8.3) and even immediate colleagues (8.5)? Is the seminal 
principle of free-sharing going to be respected? The uncompromising 
tone found in some of statements (4.5, 1.7, 3.12, 8.5) could be taken as 
an indication of how serious the situation is perceived to be. The 
market, for example, constitutes a force that recognizes no limits (9.5, 
8.3). The boundaries defining the roles of faculty (3.6, 3.8, 3.12, 
8.3, 3.4, 9.5) and the fundamental purpose of the university (1.6) 
itself have become porous and fuzzy. 
As shown in Table 5.8, similar inferences can be drawn on the 
basis of those statements achieving a negative consensus. 
Table 5.8 
Distribution of Negatively Consensual Statements in Factors A and B 
Most Unlike Most Like 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
(11.1) 11.1 (4.6) (9.1) 
4.6 9.1 
10.2 (10.2) 
List of Negatively Consensual Statements with Factor Scores 
11.1 Where large investments are involved,companies should Scores 
have the right to review faculty appointments. -4 -5 
4.6 Free and open exchanges in science that threaten 
industrial leadership are justifiably controlled. -3 -3 
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9.1 Too much weight is given to the role of peer-reviewed 
journals in the process of scientific communication. 
Science doesn't not exist until it is published. -2 -2 
10.2 Policy concerning university-industry relations 
should be set and resolved at the department level. -1 -2 
Discussion of Negatively Consensual Card Distribution 
On the whole, these statements do nothing to contradict the themes 
drawn from the positively consensual items. The implicit issues of 
encroachment and boundary crop up again. Specifically, it is up to 
faculty, not business operatives, to determine access to academic 
membership and information (11.1, 4.6). Although the emphasis is 
weaker, quality control (9.1) is also an exclusively academic matter. 
These exigent statements send off caution signals like a blinking yellow 
light. They attempt to firm up lines. They also "feel" defensive, 
thrown up as roadblocks to prevent something undesirable from occurring. 
Now that we have observed what the factors share in common, 
attention shifts to the meanings contained in the context of the 24 
statements which discriminate most between factors (Table 5.9, p. 86). 
Card codes bracketed within parentheses signify factor A historians. 
Discussion of Meaningfully Differentiated Statements 
Observe that all but two of factor A's (historians) scores are 
found to the left of the zero cell. And only three statements (4.8, 
6.3, 9.7) are shown to have earned high positive or negative scores. 
Conversely, only one factor B (polymer scientists and engineers) score 
displays even a slight negative valence. Polymer scientists, moreover, 
allocated fifteen (15) statements to the +5 cell. The relative location 
of statements suggests that factor A historians regard the subject 
85 
Table 5.9 
Distribution of Statement Items with Score Differentials 
of 4 or More by Factor 
(Factor A Historians in Parens) 
Most Unlike 
-5 -4 
(4.8) 
(6.3) 
Most Like 
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
(2.5) 2.5 
(2.9) 2.9 
(2.10) 2.10 
(2.11) 2.11 
(2.14) 2.14 
(3.2) 3.2 
(3.5) 3.5 
(3.10) 3.10 
(3.11) 3.11 
(3.14) 3.14 
(3.16) 3.16 
(4.2) 4.2 
(4.4) 4.4 
(4.7) 4.7 
4.8 
(4.10) 4.10 
(4.15) 4.15 
(5.4) 5.4 
(5.11) 5.11 
(6.2) 6.2 
6.3 
(7.1) 7.1 
9.7 (9.7) 
matter configured here far less enthusiastically than their factor B 
counterparts. This statement map is also significant because of what is 
absent. It would appear that historians and scientists have no 
fundamental disagreement over the Traditionalist values featured in 
category 1 (the university as a non-market phenomenon) statements. 
It might help to simplify the interpretive process once again by 
focusing on each major subject category in Table 5.9 (the university as 
an economic entity, disinterestedness/autonomy, the treatment of 
intellectual property) in turn. 
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Table 5.10 
Distribution of Category 2 (the university as an economic 
entity) Statements by Factors (Historians in parens) 
Most Unlike Most Like 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
(2.5) 2.5 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
2.9 
2.10 
(2.11) 
(2.14) 
2.11 
2.14 
Listing of Category 2 Statements with Factor Scores 
2.5 The claims made by critics of university-industry 
ties exaggerate the negative impacts and neglect 
the reciprocal benefits to both institutions. 
Scores 
A B 
-1 +5 
2.9 The scientific process is essentially self- 
correcting, and more research money, not 
management, is all that is needed to rectify 
abuses of the past. -3 +2 
2.10 More industrial support induces wider scientific 
participation, which in turn elevates the level 
of cross-collaboration, which is what ultimately 
moves science ahead. 0 +5 
2.11 The effects of industry funding of universities 
are no different from those of government funding. -1 +3 
2.14 A more applied orientation will be good for 
American university science, reducing the academic 
isolation that developed during earlier postwar 
periods. -1 +5 
Discussion of Category 2 Statement Distribution 
The distribution of category 2 statements suggests that factor A 
historians and factor B polymer scientists/engineers are at odds over 
the implications of industry funding of academic science. Historians in 
this case seem to perceive corporate support as different (2.11), 
vaguely foreign and possibly harmful (2.5). This orientation begins to 
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explain the hedging by historians alluded to earlier in Table 5.6. 
Perhaps motivated by more utilitarian concerns (2.14), factor B polymer 
scientists/engineers view the issue of corporate funding in a more 
optimistic light (2.5, 2.10, 2.11). In the collective eye of factor B 
scientists, the benefits of industry/university collaboration appear to 
outweigh the drawbacks (2.5). Industry money really does not pose any 
new concerns (2.11). Indeed, these arrangements foster and promote 
intellectual cross-fertilization (2.10) while enlarging the role of 
university science (2.14). 
Perhaps most revealing, for the first time we are briefly exposed 
to different thinking about scientific epistemology. Does the 
enthusiasm evinced by polymer scientists stem from a belief in a 
socially neutral, essentialist science (2.9)? If this is the case, why 
worry about the university's alliances if scientific processes are self- 
adjusting (2.9)? By extension, evidently factor A historians don't 
share this optimistic idea of contextual isolation, but rather deem 
scientific action as culturally vulnerable. Perhaps historians hesitate 
because they believe traditions to be fragile. 
Table 5.11 
Distribution of Category 3 (academic disinterestedness) 
Statements by Factor (Factor A historians in parens) 
Most Like Most Unlike 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
(3.2) 3.2 
(3.5) 3.5 
(3.10) 3.10 
(3.11) 3.11 
(3.14) 3.14 
(3.16) 3.16 
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Listing of Category 3 Statements with Factor Scores 
3.2 Limits should be placed on how much time faculty 
can devote to outside concerns. The one-fifth 
rule allowing one day per week is fair and 
adequate. 
Scores 
A B 
+1 +5 
3.5 Conflicts of interest can be minimized or avoided 
altogether by vigilance and good faith. -1 +5 
3.10 Universities are very much aware of complex 
issues like conflict of interest involved in 
technology-transfer activities and are 
dealing with them. -2 +3 
3.11 As long as I don't have controlling interest 
in a company, my personal financial information 
is a private affair, irrelevant to my research. -1 +5 
3.14 It's a shame that the whole issue of disclosure 
and divestiture is based on the assumption that 
financial rewards affect a researcher's work. -2 +3 
3.16 There is nothing improper with companies paying 
for trips to scientific meetings and paying 
university scientists to talk at those meetings 
about topics related to the company's products. -2 +3 
Discussion of Category 3 Statement Distribution 
The historians and polymer scientists/engineers comprising factors 
A and B apparently maintain different viewpoints of what it is to be 
"disinterested.” "Disinterestedness" or intellectual autonomy is 
defined in the Traditionalist (Mertonian) sense as intellectual work 
that is free of any extraneous obligation. Scientific interest serves 
no other master, but is ideally motivated for its own sake (Richards, 
1987). Breaches of this alleged institutional neutrality constitute 
conflicts of interest. 
The six statements in dispute here seem to imply that historians 
and polymer scientists/engineers define conflicted interest differently. 
Factor A historians, for example, appear to believe that conflicts of 
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interest should receive more serious consideration (3.5, 3.10). Hopeful 
expressions of good faith and the enforcement of "one fifth" rules are 
in themselves not enough to insure the intellectual freedom of academic 
work. Academicians possess no special immunity from "external" 
influences (3.14). There is an unspoken suggestion that stricter 
definitions and enforcements are in order. 
Factor B polymer scientists/engineers, on the other hand, 
apparently reduce the issue to the level of individual probity (3.5, 
3.14). Conflicts of interest stem from a class of individual conduct 
rather than a structural one. If one is aware of the pitfalls and 
practices in good faith, conflict of interest should not be a concern 
(3.5). As a result, the polymer scientist treads where the historian 
fears to go (3.14). For example, one's personal finances, relationships 
with industry and honorarium should not be problematic for the 
sophisticated scientist (3.11, 3.16). Perhaps this confidence may be 
attributed again to a particular definition of science as a cognitive 
dimension safely removed from the everyday importunities and compromises 
endemic to the "outside" world. It follows, then, that, excepting 
traditional safeguards (3.2), no need exists for outside meddling in the 
private affairs of individual scientists (3.5, 3.10, 3.11). In the end, 
the definition of conflicted interests is properly left to the 
discretion of the individual scientist (3.11, 3.14, 3.16). 
This interpretation implies that historians and scientists use 
different levels of analysis. It seems that historians prefer to 
interpret phenomena at the cultural/sociological level while polymer 
scientists emphasize the micro-analytic. Is social imperative or the 
heroic authority of the individual the ultimate locus of action? These 
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concerns readily translate into issues of power, of course. Sensitive 
to the expanding regulatory prerogative of outside agencies, is the 
scientist's principal concern to stake out inviolate territory? In the 
meantime, stymied by this conceptual inconsistency, a definition of 
conflicted interest goes begging. For example, do questions of conflict 
properly extend beyond curiosity/motivation to include project design, 
methodology and the overall direction of scientific activity? 
Table 5.12 
Distribution of Category 4 (Intellectual Property) Statements 
by Factor (Factor A historians in parens) 
Most Unlike Most Like 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
(4.2) 4.2 
(4.4) 4.4 
(4.7) 4.7 
(4.8) 4.8 
(4.10) 4.10 
(4.15) 4.15 
Listing of Category 4 Statements with Factor Scores 
4.2 Some infringements of the university's principle Scores 
of free dissemination of information should be A B 
allowed on a case by case basis in order to protect 
the university's financial interest. -3 +2 
4.4 Modest changes in university rules regarding 
intellectual property will allow commercial 
activities to go forward without threatening 
traditional values. -2 +5 
4.7 In expensive, large-scale university-corporate 
research partnerships, faculty should be 
required to sign confidentiality statements in 
which they agree not to disclose proprietary 
information. -2 +5 
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4.8 Given industry's heavy investment in areas of 
university research, I see nothing wrong with 
submitting manuscripts to the company for 
review prior to submission to a journal. -4 
4.10 In order to protect worldwide commercialization 
rights for new technologies, it's perfectly 
acceptable for universities to ask their 
scientists to delay publication of their research 
findings to allow time for patents to be filed. -2 
4.15 While commercial interests sometimes stand in 
the way of full disclosure of scientific results, 
this impediment is more than compensated for by 
the infusion of additional funds which 
accelerates research thus increases the amount 
of scientific knowledge. -2 
+5 
+5 
+5 
Discussion of Category 4 Statement Distribution 
Both the Instrumentalist and Traditionalist schools subscribe to 
the conviction that scientific custom and community depend on proper 
communication. Science is first and last an unrestricted dialogue or 
"cross-fertilization of ideas" (Mulkay, 1979). In short, the free 
sharing of ideas entails an ethics balanced against certain threats and 
risks. The ultimate threat against scientific reciprocity (and the 
generation of new ideas) being, of course, non-circulation or secrecy. 
The Traditionalist in particular abides no deviation from 
altruistic norms. It comes as somewhat of a surprise, then, that factor 
A historians invest so little energy (excepting statement 4.8) into this 
sensitive issue. Perhaps, as found earlier, low scores indicate that 
this group of historians, at any rate, work in an arena largely 
unaffected by pressures to accommodate other interests. The card sorts 
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suggest that historians and polymer scientists work in distinct 
contexts. 
The polymer scientists' enthusiastic endorsement of the 
Instrumentalist values captured in these six statements possibly 
reflects the special conditions of contemporary polymer research. It 
seems that factor B polymer scientists consider the ideal of open 
research a contingent concept (4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.10, 4.15). Perhaps this 
reflects a utilitarian attitude marking an accommodation to get a job 
done. Such a pragmatic orientation would not be considered unusual in 
technological sciences such as polymer science, agriculture, medicine 
and engineering. Practices like submitting manuscripts for review by 
sponsoring companies (4.8), delaying publication to allow time for 
patent filing (4.10), and signing confidentiality agreements (4.7) also 
concern academic authority, autonomy, and motivation - who and what is 
the scientist working for (audience, motives), and who determines 
scientific merit and how is this judgment to be made? Do these 
"violations" of the cosmopolitan ethos of pure science confirm polymer 
science as applied? Under these circumstances, is the pure science vs. 
applied science debate relevant any more? We are beginning to see how 
social definitions of boundaries work. 
Attention now turns to the remaining (miscellaneous) statements 
which differentiate historians and polymer scientists. These statements 
are displayed in Table 5.13 (p. 95). 
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Table 5.13 
Distribution of Miscellaneous Statements by Factor 
(Factor A historians in parens) 
Most Unlike Most Like 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
(5.4) 
(5.11) 
5.4 
5.11 
(6.2) 6.2 
(6.3) 
(7.1) 
6.3 
7.1 
9.7 (9.7) 
Listing of Miscellaneous Statements with Factor Scores 
5.4 Every university should be able to catalog the 
expertise of its members and then market those 
talents for fees or grants from corporations or 
other clientele. 
Scores 
A B 
-3 +4 
5.11 There's nothing inappropriate for academic sci¬ 
entists, while holding regular academic 
appointments, to be proprietors, exclusively or 
jointly, in private business firms in which 
scientific knowledge gained in their academic 
capacity is to be used. 0 
6.2 It does not make any difference if the private 
sector replaces or complements government as the 
patron of science so long as the professional 
reward system of academe is preserved. -2 
6.3 All professors should be obliged to develop 
revenue-generating projects as part of their 
responsibility. A professor's ability to 
generate funds should be one of the conditions 
of tenure. -4 
+5 
+5 
+1 
7.1 The legal safeguards built into large corporate 
-university contracts plus procedural limits 
established by the university are more than 
adequate to protect the institutional autonomy 
of the academic scientific community. -3 
9.7 Corporate sponsorship should be subject to peer 
review. 
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Discussion of Miscellaneous Statement Distribution 
While the final six statements are too few to probe much beneath 
the surface of any particular category (entrepreneurism, 5.4, 5.11; 
career reward structure, 6.2, 6.3; project design, 7.1; and quality 
control, 9.7), they provide useful examples of the tensions dividing 
Traditionalists and Instrumentalists. For example, statement 5.4 refers 
to the overall social purpose of research universities. The 
Traditionalist asks whether faculty can realistically be academics and 
businessmen at the same time without neglecting vital educational and 
dialogic duties. Statement 5.4 also hints of a (Traditionalist) concern 
about the extension of the price-system into hitherto protected areas of 
the university. The commodification of knowledge that this purportedly 
facilitates will see the university's traditional social forms 
supplanted by economic instrumentality. Polymer scientists manifest 
more enthusiasm than historians (5.4 and 5.11); university-industry 
contracts, after all, have built-in safeguards (7.1) negating the need 
for peer oversight of such agreements (9.7). 
Historians, once again, are more difficult to read. They reject 
strategies to market university talent (5.4) but are completely 
indifferent to university scientists commercially exploiting the fruit 
of their academic research (5.11). Perhaps historians find this last 
issue too remote. Not surprisingly, perhaps, historians are clearly 
unhappy with statement 6.3 and have less faith in good faith legal 
arrangements with industry. Perhaps these opposing reactions stem once 
again from two different "takes" on these issues - one (historians) 
cultural and moral; the other (polymer scientists) legal. 
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This chapter closes with an analysis of those statements which 
most sharply discriminate the composite points of view represented by 
factors A and B. 
Table 5.14 
Distribution of Statements Most Sharply Discriminative 
(cells -5, -4, and +5, +4) for Factor A (Historians) 
Most 
-5 
Unlike 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 
Most Like 
+4 +5 
2. 6 3.9 
4.8 
6.3 
11.1 
3.6 4.9 
9.7 8.3 
11.2 
Listing of Negatively Scored Statements 
2.6 Universities exist mainly to help industry turn knowledge into 
technology, technology into productivity, and productivity into 
profit. Cell (-5) 
3.9 Scientists who review other scientists' work for federal research 
agencies or for scientific journals have no obligation to reveal 
whether they have a financial stake in the research they are 
reviewing. (-4) 
4.8 Given industry's heavy investment in some areas of university 
research, I see nothing wrong with submitting manuscripts to the 
company for review prior to submission to a journal. (-4) 
6.3 All professors should be obliged to develop revenue-generating 
projects as part of their responsibility. A professor's ability 
to generate funds should be one of the conditions of tenure. (-4) 
11.1 Where large investments are involved, companies should have the 
right to review faculty appointments. (-4) 
Listing of Positively Scored Statements 
4.9 A few heavily endowed industrial projects can distort the values 
and mission of the university. Industrial projects bring with 
them a new kind of scientific culture that rewards marketable 
research and protects proprietary information. (+5) 
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8.3 Market forces have always been a part of the shifts among posts in 
U.S. academia, but now the scale has dramatically altered their 
significance. These changes have created rifts within the 
faculties of each institution; the humanities and social science 
faculties often feel that they are being neglected. (+5) 
11.2 The availability of industrial funding encourages hiring in 
specific areas, which may not match education's long-term 
priorities. (+5) 
3.6 The pattern of collaboration between large universities and large 
corporations may be a familiar one. But the implications for the 
use of taxpayers' funds and the danger of conflicts of interest 
that these agreements raise require renewed evaluation. (+4) 
9.7 Corporate sponsorship should be subject to peer review. (+4) 
Discussion of Discriminating Statements for Factor A 
Many of these statements constitute familiar ground, so there is 
no need to perform a statement by statement analysis at this point. 
Certain major themes need to be elaborated, however. A survey of 
statements makes clear that while factor A historians rarely slot 
opinions at the extremes, they are, nonetheless, consistent. Negatively 
scored statements are consistent and support positively scored ones and 
vice versa. Without exception, all of the statements shown above, on 
either side of zero, represent Traditionalist values. Positively scored 
statements manifest a patent distrust of new corporate/university 
partnerships. Nothing good will come from the pursuit of such alliances 
- a maldistribution of funds will raise interdisciplinary tensions 
(8.3), the conventional norms of scholarship will be undermined (4.9), 
the university's long-term interests may become a victim of the 
exigencies of the quarterly balance sheet (11.2), and such alliances 
throw the public purpose of the university into question not to mention 
that of faculty (3.5). The implications of these new alliances need to 
be reviewed by faculty (3.6, 9.7). Negatively scored statements 
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reinforce this anti-business orientation. Universities do not exist to 
turn a profit. Scholars run the risk of being recycled into 
entrepreneurs (6.3) if not corporate employees (4.8, 11.1). Added 
together, it is possible to detect a perception on the part of 
historians that events are outpacing faculty obligations and control 
(3.9, 4.8, 11.1, 4.9, 8.3). 
Table 5.15 
Distribution of Statements Most Sharply Discriminative 
(cells -5, -4, and +5, +4) for Factor B (Polymer Scientists) 
Most Unlike 
-5 -4 -3 -2 
11.1 
Most Like 
-1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
1.9 1.3 
2.3 2.5 
3.12 2.10 
4.15 2.14 
5.4 3.2 
7.2 3.5 
3.11 
3.15 
4.4 
4.7 
4.8 
4.10 
5.5 
5.7 
5.11 
6.2 
7.1 
8.3 
Listing of Positively Scored Statements 
1.3 Universities are not charged to ensure the worldly success of 
outside institutions, nor to uphold any values other than the 
sharing and improvement of ideas. Cell (+5) 
2.5 The claims made by critics of university-industry ties exaggerate 
the negative impacts and neglect the reciprocal benefits to both 
institutions. (+5) 
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2.10 More industrial support induces wider scientific participation, 
which in turn elevates the level of cross-collaboration, which is 
what ultimately moves science ahead. (+5) 
2.14 A more applied orientation will be good for American university 
science, reducing the academic isolation that developed during 
earlier postwar periods. (+5) 
3.2 Limits should be placed on how much time faculty can devote to 
outside concerns. The one fifth rule allowing one day per week is 
fair and adequate. (+5) 
3.5 Conflicts of interest can be minimized or avoided altogether by 
vigilance and good faith. (+5) 
3.11 As long as I don't have controlling interest in a company, my 
personal financial information is a private affair, irrelevant to 
my research. (+5) 
3.15 It is not proper to use graduate students to work on research a 
faculty member does for her firm. (+5) 
4.4 Modest changes in university rules regarding intellectual property 
will allow commercial activities to go forward without threatening 
traditional values. (+5) 
4.7 In expensive, large-scale university-corporate research 
partnerships, faculty should be required to sign confidentiality 
statements in which they agree not to disclose proprietary 
information. (+5) 
4.8 Given industry's heavy investment in some areas of university 
research, I see nothing wrong with submitting manuscripts to the 
company for review prior to submission to a journal. (+5) 
4.10 In order to protect worldwide commercialization rights for new 
technologies, it's perfectly acceptable for universities to ask 
their scientists to delay publication of their research findings 
to allow time for patents to be filed. (+5) 
5.5 The social structure of science changes dramatically after 
discoveries become inventions and researchers entrepreneurs. (+5) 
5.7 If you make the ethics of academic science the same as Wall 
Street, you're going to corrupt science. (+5) 
5.11 There's nothing inappropriate for academic scientists, while 
holding regular academic appointments, to be proprietors, 
exclusively or jointly, in private business firms in which 
scientific knowledge gained in their academic capacity is to be 
used. (+5) 
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6.2 It does not make any difference if the private sector replaces or 
complements government as the patron of science as long as the 
professional reward system of academe is preserved. (+5) 
7.1 The legal safeguards built into large corporate-university 
contracts plus procedural limits established by the university are 
more than adequate to protect the institutional autonomy of the 
academic scientific community. (+5) 
8.3 Market forces have always been a part of the shifts among posts in 
U.S. academia, but now the scale has dramatically altered their 
significance. These changes have created rifts within the 
faculties of each institution; the humanities and social science 
faculties often feel that they are being neglected. (+5) 
1.9 I have some confidence that the bottom line of projects will keep 
corporations from continuing to invest in activities that are not 
good for them. I have less confidence that academia has as clear 
a yardstick to judge the merits of various arrangements for its 
own integrity. (+4) 
2.3 Continued links between the university and industry will 
legitimate the university to interests outside the university on 
the grounds of its contributions to the economic development of 
society. (+4) 
3.12 Universities should also be worried about "conflicts of 
commitment" - situations where faculty members neglect their 
academic duties in favor of pursuing other activities, such as 
consulting outside the university. (+4) 
4.15 While commercial interests sometimes stand in the way of full 
disclosure of scientific results, this impediment is more than 
compensated for by the infusion of additional funds which 
accelerates research and thus increases the amount of scientific 
knowledge. (+4) 
5.4 Every university should be able to catalog the expertise of its 
members and then market those talents for fees or grants from 
corporations or other clientele. (+4) 
7.2 With industrial support, there is relatively less freedom for the 
researcher because there is now a single line to follow, the line 
of the generous benefactor. (+4) 
Discussion of Discriminating Statements for Factor B 
Obviously, the polymer scientist/engineers have modeled a 
composite Q-sort highly skewed at the positive extreme.5 Only one 
statement (11.1) is found at the negative ("Most Unlike") extreme. Not 
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much space will be devoted to 11.1 except to comment that its singular 
location may represent the last straw for polymer scientists. In other 
words, control over the appointment of colleagues is not to be shared 
with business colleagues. Perhaps statement 11.1 embodies a dimension 
where even polymer scientists draw unambiguous lines: 
11.1 Where large investments are involved, companies 
should have the right to review faculty 
appointments. 
Again, because we have dealt earlier with virtually all of the 
statements located in cells +4 and +5, there is no need for detailed 
discussion. However, some identifying polymer themes deserve special 
recognition. For example, eight (1.9, 3.12, 7.2, 1.3, 3.15, 5.5, 5.7, 
8.3) or one third of the twenty-four statements in cells +4 and +5 
validate Traditionalist values. If the pattern of statement placement 
in factor A suggests that historians are cool and consistent; the 
pattern in factor B favors an interpretation of polymer scientists as 
enthusiastic but inconsistent. How do we square, for example, strict 
Traditionalist statements typified by 1.9, 1.3 and 5.7 with the 
utilitarian sentiments expressed in 2.3 and 5.4; or statement 3.12 with 
Instrumentalist statements 3.11 and 5.11; or the opposition between 6.2 
and 8.3? The fascinating thing is that this sample of polymer 
scientists is apparently comfortable with this mix of apparently 
irreconcilable values. Perhaps this indicates that polymer scientists, 
unlike historians, function within at least two normative worlds? 
Polymer scientists are consistently pragmatic concerning the 
treatment of intellectual property; that is, it is conditionally free. 
The ideal of open scientific communication notwithstanding, all 
circumstances are not the same (4.4). There are instances, for example, 
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where confidentiality (4.7), contractual arrangements (4.8) and 
competitive realities (4.10) have to be accounted for. These exceptions 
should not be construed as system threatening, however (3.2, 7.1). On 
the whole, the benefits of industry-university collaborations more than 
compensate for any conceivable drawbacks (2.3, 2.5, 2.10, 4.15). 
Moreover, these arrangements are not qualitatively different from 
government contracts (6.2). 
Besides, it's past time for the university to emerge from its 
self-isolation (2.3, 2.14). When irregularities happen (e.g., conflicts 
of interest) they are properly dealt with at the individual level (3.5). 
In general, the basic structure of the university and science continues 
on as before. In addition, the subjects in factor B adhere to the view 
that one's professional (inside the university) and private (outside the 
university) lives are separate and distinct (3.11, 5.11). Perhaps these 
suppositions preview examples of the kind of rhetoric necessary for 
coming to terms with the competing values above. 
Summary and Discussion of Factor Results 
Factor A Historians - Closet Traditionalists? 
Recall again the reason for employing a non-probabilistic 
(qualitative) subject sampling process. Absent any documented 
connection with the business community, historians were given the role 
of Traditionalist control group - i.e., the keepers of the university's 
ontological core. At the same time, as full-members of a technological 
science heavily reliant on industry support, the polymer scientist 
sample was deemed to represent a reasonable Instrumentalist proxy. 
Hypothetically, it was the polymer cohort's task to Q-sort the 
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academy's interactive frontier. At the outset of this research, in 
other words, each faculty set was expected to more or less faithfully 
rehearse the concentric schemas characterizing the Traditionalist/ 
Instrumentalist and organizational literatures. 
It turns out, however, that both samples produced a mild surprise. 
As expected, historians "correctly" confirmed the Traditionalist ethos 
while rejecting Instrumentalist values. This was illustrated in Table 
5.5 (Distribution of Non-Economic and Economic Statements for Factor A). 
But, overall, these endorsements (unlike the Orwellian rhetoric featured 
in the Traditionalist literature) were made with little evident 
enthusiasm, i.e., factor A historians placed very few Traditionalist 
statements in the extreme cells. This fact makes it difficult to 
identify where this particular group of historians stands - their bottom 
line, so to speak. Historians do in fact draw some lines in indelible 
ink as we saw, for example, in Table 5.9 (Distribution of Factor 
Discriminatory Statements). However, the paucity of statements at the 
extremes seems to signal a general lack of conviction. 
The Traditionalist literature's xenophobic tendencies spring from 
the conviction that the academy stands to lose far more than it gains in 
partnership with industry. For reasons that beg explanation at this 
point, our historians appear content to cheer from the sidelines. 
(Individual Q sorts provide a clue; i.e., several historians placed high 
numbers of card statements in the low value cells of -1, 0, +1. This 
seemed to parallel post-sort comments offered by some history faculty 
that many of the statement issues were new or immaterial.) 
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Instrumentalists - "Eating Your Cake and ..."? 
Polymer scientist boundaries did not materialize as predicted 
either. For their part, the sample of polymer scientists complicate 
matters by demonstrating a propensity for eating their cake and having 
it, too. Unlike Factor A historians, Factor B polymer subjects are 
highly opinionated. However, while the polymer card placements point to 
an Instrumentalist bias, polymer opinion is virtually split between 
Traditionalist (category 1 - Mertonian norms) and Instrumentalist 
(category 2 - utilitarian norms) statements (see Table 5.6 - Distri¬ 
bution of Non-Economic and Economic Statements for Factor B). We find 
that polymer sorting results contain apparent contradictions. 
The Mertonian prescription for open intellectual exchange is a 
relevant case in point. Our scientist sample categorically endorse the 
Mertonian imperative of open intellectual exchange as shown in statement 
1.3: 
Universities are not charged to ensure the 
worldly success of outside institutions, nor to 
uphold any values other than the sharing and 
improvement of ideas. X 
Yet, within the same breath (sort) they proceed to interject a long list 
of provisos such as those incorporated in statement 4.2; for example: 
Some infringements of the university's principle 
of free dissemination of information should be 
allowed on a case be case basis in order to 
protect the university's financial interest. 
or 4.4: 
Modest changes in university rules regarding 
intellectual property will allow commercial 
activities to go forward without threatening 
traditional values. (See also statements 4.7, 
4.8, 4.10, and 4.15.) 
104 
The roughly equal dispersion between themes from categories 1 and 
2 appears to highlight an important work-related contradiction. At 
least in the case of our polymer scientist sample, this and other 
similar findings suggests a possible gap between abstract and practical 
line drawing. Polymer scientists coexist in two worlds - the market and 
the academy. In the process, they have learned how to accommodate to 
both. "Reconciliations" typified in the oxymoron of "limited secrecy" 
presented here (see also Etzkowitz, 1983, 1989) hint at the creative 
nature of organizational boundary making. 
Discussion 
Factor A historians draw straight lines dividing acceptable norms 
from unacceptable ones. As expected, their lines enclose the nuclear 
academic ideals of the Mertonian catechism - disinterestedness, 
openness, etc. Yet, their cartography is so faint that interpretation 
is obscured. Factor B scientists, on the other hand, seem to have 
accommodated to two sets of contradictory lines, one Mertonian (espoused 
theory?), the other pragmatic (theory-in-use?) (Argyris & Schon, 1978). 
By comparison, because of the sectarian nature of the 
Traditionalist/Instrumentalist discourse, lines are never in doubt. The 
pure Traditionalist, as we have seen, espouses a closed logical text 
predicated on a system of boundaries and inner constraints handed down 
more or less intact from generation to generation. Recognizable 
boundaries are essential if academic society is not to lose its special 
mission and character. The pure Instrumentalist envisions a more open, 
back-scratching arrangement with government and industry. Instru¬ 
mentalist borders, consequently, resemble picket fences; nonetheless, 
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university boundaries are still real, still locatable. In step with 
organizational theory, neither of these traditions doubt that boundaries 
can be pinned down. 
That our faculty findings fail to substantiate objective boundary 
of any kind is key, however. That is, by problematizing (blunting) the 
taken-for-granted sharpness of conventional notions of demarcation, 
faculty may have empirically revealed the pragmatic and therefore 
continuous nature of organizational "boundary." For historians, it 
appears that social boundary eludes straightforward definition. Sorting 
in undertones and soft hues, their definition of boundary remains 
amorphous, undeclared. By the same token, precise translation of 
polymer scientist boundary is lost in self-contradiction. Products of 
the tension between principles and practice, polymer boundaries appear 
improvised. The diffuseness of these empirical findings echoes the 
dynamic aspect of boundary typical of the interpretive literature. Of 
more theoretical significance, however, this finding of incoherence 
problematizes the ontological adequacy of the literature's regnant 
nomenclature of enclosure. 
End Notes 
1. In this case factor loadings equal to or in excess of 2.58 (SE) - 
0.32 are significant at the 0.01 level. The standard error is 
given by the expression SE - 1/7n where N - the number of 
statements (1/766). At minimum, a factor should demonstrate at 
least two significant loadings or be excluded from further 
mathematical analysis (see Brown, 1980, pp. 221-223 for more 
detail). 
In addition to the eight factor solution a factor analysis 
forcing the extraction of only two factors was carried out. 
Results were very similar to the "natural" eight factor solution 
particularly in terms of how faculty from both departments were 
aligned on the two major factors. In the heuristic spirit of Q 
Methodology, its was decided to focus on the natural occurring 
factors A and B. (The results of the two factor solution are 
found in Appendix C.) 
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2. Statement Codes for Tables 5.3 & 5.4: 1. Universities as non¬ 
economic institutions (Strict Traditionalist); 2. Universities as 
economic institutions (Strict Instrumentalist); 3. 
Disinterestedness (academic autonomy/neutrality); 4. The social 
relations of intellectual property; 5. Faculty entrepreneurism; 6. 
Faculty reward structure - what gets recognized; 7. Who shapes the 
design of work; 8. The Academy as collectivity; 9. Quality control 
(peer review/how discovery is ratified); 10. the Organization of 
work (departmental authority); 11. Criteria for faculty 
recruitment and advancement. 
3. The lopsided number of statements in the +5 cell was somewhat of a 
surprise because on average polymer subjects placed no more than 
four cards in cell +5 (one subject placed seven statements in the 
+5 cell). Although perhaps unusual this asymmetric distribution 
occurred in this case for two reasons. One obvious explanation is 
that these particular cards were sorted into the +5 cell with high 
frequency. But it must be recalled that all Q sorts are not 
statistically equal. Some Q sorts, that is, load more heavily and 
therefore are closer approximations to a factor than others. As a 
result, they carry more "factor weight" (Brown, 1980). In other 
words, the unusual size of the +5 cell can be attributed largely 
to the extraordinary pull exerted by the heavy factor weights of 
high "loaders." 
4. Item scores were found to be significantly different 
(statistically) between factors if they differed by two or more. 
For example, if the factor array scores for an item were identical 
or only apart by one, then the item scores the same for both 
factors. However, meaningfully different scores were considered 
conservatively - to be a difference of four or more. For 
mathematical detail about how to statistically distinguish factor 
scoring, see Brown, 1980, pp. 244-246. 
5. Factor weight is given as w = f/l-f2, where f represents the 
factor loading and w the weight. Weight derives from a subject's 
factor loading which reflects the fact that some Q sorts are 
closer approximations of a factor than others. For example, the 
factor weight (w) for female subject H12 is .867/1-.8672 or 3.47. 
Whereas, Hll's factor weight works out to be only 0.91. Hll's Q 
sort, in other words, carries only (.91/3.47) or 26 percent of the 
weight of H12's Q sort for calculating factor scores - the basis 
for defining factor A's composite opinion. (See Brown, 1980, pp. 
241-242 for details.) 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT CONCLUSIONS 
Categoriality is not simply another category, but the ground for 
all categories, i.e., that which renders categories possible. 
Cognitive-affective, real-symbolic, objective-subjective, explanation- 
interpretation - all such establish rigid and often arbitrary 
boundaries, encourage exaggerated oppositional thinking and sides- 
taking, and impose intellectual barriers to a more direct experiencing 
of and feeling for the organism. Each dichotomy therefore requires 
systematic deconstruction before the dialectic can proceed in the 
direction of a more fruitful synthesis. 
Brown, 1989 
In the logic, if not the letter, of Burns and Stalker (1961), this 
research attempts to address whether organizational theory empirically 
"fits" the reality it claims to explain. In other words, does our 
theorizing adequately represent organizations as they really are? 
Accordingly, insofar as organizational boundaries frame the way we think 
about organizations, an attempt was made to empirically elucidate their 
ontological substance. Employing Q Methodology, select university 
faculty sorted a set of statements relating to the social relations of 
academic work. The "insubstantiality" of organizational borders 
elaborated in this study constitutes grounds for reflecting on the 
discipline's unspoken presuppositions regarding the "coherence, 
boundedness, and sharedness of cultural meaning systems" (Shore, 1991: 
9). 
Implications 
The results of this study have potentially unsettling implications 
for functionalist theorizing. The question that this research raises 
for the literature is this - given the interdependence of phenomena and 
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organizations today, can organizational scholars continue to entertain a 
notion of organizations as "analytically distinctive social units" 
(Georgiou, 1973) disconnected from the general societal culture 
(Smircich, 1985; Calas & Smircich, 1987, 1988) and still claim 
relevance? 
That is, as organizational action escapes our attempts to contain 
it, organizational analysis needs to shift from a near-exclusive 
absorption with locating social structures on the "inside" and begin to 
seriously address their elaboration within an interorganizational 
context (the "outside") (Pondy, 1977; Calas & McGuire, 1990; Clegg, 
1990). If conventional analytic dichotomies such as external/internal 
or environment/organization (or Traditionalist/Instrumentalist) 
represent prime examples of "misplaced concreteness" (products of logic 
infused with an empirical existence) (Weick, 1977); and, moreover, if 
these binary categorizations are found to be increasingly out of touch 
with a cosmopolitan empirical reality, then epistemology emerges as the 
new focus of analytic concern (Weick, 1976, 1977; Manning, 1979; 
Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Turner, 1990). Analysis, in short, properly 
shifts to how analysts and practitioners draw their lines. 
After all is said and done, Traditionalists and Instrumentalists 
are both right and wrong at the same time. The Instrumentalist 
proposition that no sharp lines exist is a valid one - as far as it 
goes. But the Instrumentalist, I feel, misses the (Traditionalist) 
point. I would like to suggest that the Traditionalist promotes the 
preservation of an "ideal" university because, as these findings 
suggest, there are no sharp edges. That is, Traditionalists persist 
precisely because borders are vague and dynamic extensions of "the 
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incoherence of the academic structure" (Veysey, 1965: 442). For some at 
least, ambiguity is a poor defense against the erosion of academic 
independence and other signifying institutional values. 
Let's take a moment to expand on the theoretical discussion 
developed in Chapter 2. Recall that we constructed an annulated model 
of organization in which the organization literature was partitioned 
into two concentric theoretical fields. For example, the model's 
outermost zone was described as functioning as a theoretical cordon 
sanitaire dampening any environmental force with the potential to 
overwhelm the organization's homologous identity. Pioneered in open 
systems and contingency theories, this setting represents the permeable 
negotiating arena where "fits" and equilibriums, subunit power, 
bargaining and influence, power struggles, loose coupling, new 
organizational designs, etc.- are pretested and enacted. 
We saw also that all energy emanates from the model's climate - 
controlled command center (seen occupying the center of Figure 2.1). 
This core space enshrines the Classical genre's invariable macro-logic 
regarding managerial authority and organizational form (Graf, 1979; 
Miller & O'Leary, 1989). To maintain (i.e., to keep all other 
expression out) and possibly extend and consolidate its security and 
power (see Williamson, 1975), the core relies on the aura of objective, 
non-negotiable boundaries to deflect any potentially de-centering forces 
that penetrate the perimeter (see Figure 6.1.). 
Shown from above (management's perspective), this concentric model 
illustrates the literature's ambivalence regarding the substantivity of 
organizational ontology. Analogous to the Traditionalist/Instru- 
mentalist discourse, organizational theory waffles between a faith in 
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Figure 6.1. The Ins(ides) and Outs(ides) of Organizational Theory 
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the "real," "substantive" constructs deployed by Classical theorists 
(the core) and the negotiable versions qualifying more recent theorizing 
(the borderlands). Parthasarthy and Sethi's (1992) article typifies 
this conceptual schizophrenia. 
But from another angle we can see that not all ontology is equal. 
If we carefully turn the model on its side, we obtain a better picture 
of its distinctive ontological shape (see Figure 6.2.). In profile, the 
central core resembles a citadel granting those privileged enough to sit 
at the top a commanding vista of the surrounding environment. The 
citadel's stony physicality embodies what is lasting, good, prototypic. 
Conversely, everything lying outside the citadel's implacable identity - 
i.e., anything implying "impermanence, dissolvability, and tacitness" 
(Astley & Zajac, 1991) is routinely designated a dysfunctional anomaly 
or pathology. It is the hierarchic authority of this ontological 
monument that is at stake here. Boundaries, as these schema indicate, 
are not simply inert physical circumscriptions, but flexible constructs 
that define "how things ought to be, what is good and worthwhile" (Adams 
& Ingersoll, 1990). 
The Traditionalist literature cautions that the constitution of a 
field of research as well as the content of inquiry and the treatment of 
results (distribution and validation) does not occur in a normative 
vacuum. "The management of science...has an ideological content, 
insofar as science is in itself a 'normative' activity" (Aronowitz, 
1988). The more science is conceived as power (Aronowitz, 1988), the 
prospect is enhanced that compromises will be struck, allowing 
proprietary concerns (patents, copyrights, secrecy) to co-opt a 
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Figure 6.2. The Ontological Profile of the Organizational Literature 
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university culture predicated in principle on open debate, peer review 
and publication. 
Arguably, the very structure of modern multi-universities made 
resistance unlikely. The specialization of curriculum and profes¬ 
sionalization of faculty, hierarchic authority, as well as a "commercial 
compulsion" (Bledstein, 1976; Berry, 1985) to satisfy student/customers 
in a competitive effort to meet enrollment quotas have allegedly denied 
higher education any intellectual thematic coherence (Bledstein, 1976; 
Berry, 1985; Graff, 1985). The imperatives of career and speciality 
served to isolate faculty and students leaving the operational 
definition of universities in the hands of people most disposed to the 
praxis of the bottom line, i.e., the administration. 
Bledstein (1976) adds that "In every modern nation, the 
educational system has represented goals embedded within the 
expectations of the culture" (309). That is, the structural 
arrangements between universities and their context to a large degree 
frame their definitions. Thus it happened that the occupational 
relations and pragmatic impulses of the multi-university increasingly 
corresponded with those operative in corporate culture. Like industry, 
the university experience came to stress means ("how to make") over ends 
("how to judge") (Berry, 1985). 
The "indeterminancy" of borders empirically elaborated in this 
study, then, opens the literature's core territorial assumptions (the 
citadel) to transgression and interpretation. If, in other words, the 
"thingness" (Weick, 1977) of borders can no longer be sustained 
unproblematically, how is the Archimedian point of the management 
science universe - the single-minded, factual "organization - to be 
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located? Without firm boundaries, "insides" and "outsides" are no 
longer knowable. And "organizations" and "environments" dissolve into 
disorganized, deterritorialized "nonplaces" (Ashley, 1989). The general 
effect for theory is one of epistemic vertigo as we lose the ability to 
"position ourselves within this space and cognitively map it" (Stepanson 
& Jameson, 1988: 7). 
The broad scale redrawing of institutional borders apparently 
underway today suggests that we reconsider interpretive grammar that 
promotes organizations as sovereign and unified "centre(s) of 
calculation and classification" (Clegg, 1990). The literature has 
acknowledged dimensionless artifacts like power, technology, and culture 
(although it still endeavors to calibrate them). Now the central 
theoretical issue is how to (re)think about organizations in a non¬ 
discrete world without slipping back into rationalistic and 
functionalist (i.e., territorialized) thinking? Perhaps a place to 
begin this reconceptualization is with the question, why is the 
literature in the "shape" it's in? What does the core mean? Why is 
it so central? Most importantly, what is closed to discussion (the real 
"outside") when theory is rooted in place(s)? 
Organizations other than universities face comparable issues with 
regard to "deterritorialization" (Ashley & Walker, 1990). Computer- 
integrated manufacturing, global electronic capital transfers, 
ecological events, the multi-(supra)national corporation, etc. 
represent examples of "placeless" action. That is, to think of 
organizations in the exclusivist imagery validated in neo-classical 
theory (Perrow, 1986), and/or in the narrow micro-trading emphasis of 
transaction-costs economics (Williamson, 1975) is to grossly over- 
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simplify the symbiotic tapestry of contemporary interorganizational 
relations (Calas & McGuire, 1990). With or without the aid of formal 
theory, practitioners also need to contemplate the ecumenical (i.e., 
Bamardian) implications of these boundary transcendent phenomena. 
Limitations 
From an interpretive perspective, this cross-sectional analysis 
only scratches the surface. There is the immediate business of 
following up on the present research (Brown, 1980). The 
interpretations derived here, for example, need to be verified with 
subject faculties. In-depth interviews might help us learn more about 
the reasons individual faculty and cohorts sorted as they did. 
Other questions need to be explored. Our findings indicate that 
opinion divides along more than simply departmental lines. How, for 
example, do generation and gender, impact the sorting process? Pfeffer 
(1982) observes that academic gestalts are largely historical products 
of where and when graduate training occurs. An inter- 
generational design might provide a needed baseline to assess the 
penetration of market values over time. 
Clearly, the opinions of women faculty need to be examined in more 
depth. The five female historians - the only women in the faculty 
sample - loaded virtually as a unit on Factor A. Is it with female 
faculty and other professional "minorities" where relatively pure, 
sharp-edged "Traditionalist" academic boundaries are to be found? 
In addition, the size (31) of the faculty sample employed in this 
research limits extrapolation. Except for faculty with similar 
demographic profiles, we are not in a position to generalize about how 
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other academic and non-academic administrative and research personnel 
might factor. We need to cast our net farther if we are to develop a 
broader sense of the prevalence of marketplace thinking among different 
university constituencies. 
Given the continuing interest of policy makers in the direction 
and content of Industry-university relations (see Blumenthal, et al., 
1986, 1986a; and the survey sponsored by the Office of Technology 
Assessment [OTA] [1984]), this study may be viewed as a preview as well 
as a pretest for a more encompassing research effort. The sample used 
here, therefore, should be expanded to include more "insiders" such as 
faculty from a more diverse selection of disciplines, students and 
university administrators; and "outsiders" such as industrial scientists 
and managers, federal grant administrators and state legislators. With 
some 3600 colleges and universities in this country, including 100 
serious research schools (Radin, 1991), not to mention industry, there 
is no shortage of sites to chose from. 
Contributions 
Regarding method, this study suggests that Q can be an effective 
mechanism for clarifying the elements shaping normative border disputes. 
This largely stems from the proposition that Q provides a reliable means 
to probe sensitive issues via the anonymity inherent in the statement 
sorting process itself. Thus, Q offers a possible way around the self- 
reporting bias diminishing the value of other approaches particularly 
for red button items such as conflicts of interest or questions 
concerning institutional goals and identity (see Krimsky, Ennis, & 
Weissman [1991]). Q, for example, might have helped Brandeis faculty 
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and administrators to simplify the sometimes prickly "vortex of swirling 
perceptions" unleashed during the university's recent quest to redefine 
itself (Leatherman, 1990). Other applications for boundary-oriented 
research might include surveying physician opinion regarding the 
rationing of health care or the effects of physician joint ventures and 
other investment relationships with health care facilities. 
Closer to home, Q might also clarify aspects of the Internalist 
(science is impervious to social context), Externalist (science is 
another social problem) debate once preoccupying the sociology of 
science (Barnes & Edge, 1982). Perhaps subjectivist theory has eclipsed 
Internalist theory in the minds of sociologists, but, as our findings 
seem to suggest, Internalism may live on in the laboratory. As in the 
case of the border dispute between Traditionalists and Instrumentalists, 
perhaps Q can aid us in developing a more nuanced understanding of how 
scientists reconcile working contradictions between theory and practice 
(Etzkowitz, 1983, 1989). 
The value of this research is that it demonstrates the possibility 
of studying process as it cognitively happens. This is important for 
theory and practice because the concept of continuity changes 
everything. Boundarylessness, therefore, is not just a metaphor but a 
description of a reconstituting reality. Questions of control, 
heretofore so central to management and theory, - who defines, who 
determines - are non-questions - illusory. In the end, the citadel is 
actually a castle of sand because of the inverse relationship between 
interdependence and control. The real issue, then, is how do we 
reconcile ourselves with the fact that boundarylessness has become the 
norm? How, for example, will university officials compensate for recent 
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cancellations of state-supported economic-development research grants 
made to universities as recently as the mid-1980s (Blumenstyk, 1992)? 
How do those in the role of theorists model "organizations" swept up in 
the on-going process of interdependent reconfiguration? 
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE SCORE SHEET FOR Q SORT 
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APPENDIX B 
POPULATION (66) OF Q STATEMENTS BY TOPIC CATEGORY 
122 
SAMPLE SCORE SHEET FOR Q SORT 
most 
characteristic 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 ♦2 ■»3 +4 
(2) (2) 
(3) (3) 
(A) (M 
(5) (5) (5) 
Sample Respondent Demographics 
Age _ Position: Assistant, Associate, Full Professor 
Years of full-time academic teaching and research _ 
Number of Publications _ 
Number of Conference Presentations _ 
Teach graduate students: Yes/No. 
Number of research grants from: 
Government agencies _ 
Industry _ 
Foundations _ 
Other _ 
On the average, how many days a year do you devote to consulting for 
industry and/or government? _ 
How many of the following do you hold: 
Patents _ 
Copyrights _ 
Have you ever: 
Planned or actually formed a business venture based on your research? 
Yes/No. 
Sat on any scientific advisory boards to industry? Yes/No. 
Actively explored integrating your professional work with an existing 
company(ies)? Yes/No. 
Participated in any joint research projects with industry? Yes/No. 
Does your department have: 
Staff from firms in private industry held non-salaried or salaried 
faculty appointments? Yes/No. 
Staff from private industry offered courses for academic credit? 
Yes/No. 
Members of your department left the university to form their own 
firms in order to commercialize the results of their research? 
Yes/No. 
On average, what percentage of the graduate students trained in your 
department go on to take jobs in industry? _ 
most 
uncharacteristic 
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Population (66) of Q Statements by Topic Category 
(1) 
(1:1) 
(1:2) 
(1:3) 
(1:4) 
(1:5) 
(1:6) 
(1:7) 
(1:8) 
(1:9) 
Universities as Non-Economic Institutions (Traditionalist) 
Problem solving in service to industry is gradually eroding 
the norm of discipline education and bringing the academic 
in contact with groups outside the university who have 
little regard for autonomous reason and ethics. 
Close links between the university and industry are merely 
the reflection within the research community of a broader 
strategy adopted by U.S. capital, namely its effort to 
tighten control over access to the results of scientific 
research. 
Universities are not charged to ensure the worldly success 
of outside institutions, nor to uphold any values other than 
the sharing and improvement or ideas. 
As the university budget squeeze continues, it becomes 
increasingly clear that the university cannot sustain both a 
broad liberal arts curriculum that emphasizes teaching of 
basic intellectual skills and values, and a commitment to 
competitive advanced research with commercial profit. 
Gradually the former is losing. 
University officials maintain that they must pursue the path 
of commercial research in order to support their educational 
activities. In reality, they are sacrificing those 
educational activities in order to support their commercial 
ventures. 
The question for the '90s is whether universities are to be 
public-sector institutions spending public money or 
private-sector institutions supported with public money. 
It's always a mistake to reduce support for fundamental 
science in order to address things you think may have more 
immediate applications. 
Both university and corporate participants presume 
incorrectly that their diverse interests can be easily 
harmonized, and that problems can be easily worked out. 
I have some confidence that the bottom line of projects will 
keep corporations from continuing to invest in activities 
that are not good for them. I have less confidence that 
academia has as clear a yardstick to judge the merits of 
various arrangements for its own integrity. 
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(1:10) The university, heretofore viewed by business as a source of 
training persons and expert advice, is now being looked at 
as a factor of production. 
(1:11) Expensive, well-publicized corporate/university partnerships 
are dangerous not only for the threats they pose to the 
traditions of academic science, but because other 
institutions will use these instances as "models" of the way 
university-industry agreements ought to be. 
(2) Universities as Economic Institutions ('Instrumentalist') 
(2:2) The research university must assume a third function - 
economic development - in addition to the traditional ones 
of teaching and research. 
(2:3) Continued links between the university and industry will 
legitimate the university to interests outside the 
university on the grounds of its contributions to the 
economic development of society. 
(2:5) The claims made by critics of university-industry ties 
exaggerate the negative impacts and neglect the reciprocal 
benefits to both institutions. 
(2:6) Universities exist mainly to help industry turn knowledge 
into technology, technology into productivity, and 
productivity into profit. 
(2:9) The scientific process is essentially self-correcting, and 
more research money, not management, is all that is needed 
to rectify abuses of the past. 
(2:10) More industrial support induces wider scientific 
participation, which in turn elevates the level of 
cross-collaboration, which is what ultimately moves science 
ahead. 
(2:11) The effects of industry funding of universities are no 
different from those of government funding. 
(2:14) A more applied orientation will be good for American 
university science, reducing the academic isolation that 
developed during earlier postwar periods. 
(3) Disinterestedness ('Academic Autonomy) 
(3:2) Limits should be placed on how much time faculty can devote 
to outside concerns. The one-fifth rule allowing one day 
per week is fair and adequate. 
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(3:4) 
(3:5) 
(3:6) 
(3:7) 
(3:8) 
(3:9) 
(3:10) 
(3:11) 
(3:12) 
(3:13) 
(3:14) 
(3:15) 
Scientists who shift their attention to the economic 
benefits of research or who hold equity in firms that market 
scientific discoveries cannot, at the same time, serve 
society as disinterested experts on the impacts of the new 
scientific technologies. 
Conflicts of interest can be minimized or avoided altogether 
by vigilance and good faith. 
The pattern of collaboration between large universities and 
large corporations may be a familiar one. But the 
implications for the use of taxpayers' funds and the danger 
of conflicts of interest that these agreements raise require 
renewed evaluation. 
Congress should press for public disclosure of faculty 
members' extramural ties and for the release of the texts of 
corporate-sponsored research agreements at universities. 
Researchers should pledge that while a study is in progress, 
they will not hold stock in the companies making or 
distributing the products being evaluated. 
Scientists who review other scientists' work for federal 
research agencies or for scientific journals have no 
obligation to reveal whether they have a financial stake in 
the research they are reviewing. 
Universities are very much aware of complex issues like 
conflict of interest involved in technology-transfer 
activities and are dealing with them. 
As long as I don't have controlling interest in a company, 
my personal financial information is a private affair, 
irrelevant to my research. 
Universities should also be worried about "conflicts of 
commitment" - situations where faculty members neglect their 
academic duties in favor of pursuing other activities, such 
as consulting outside the university. 
The best way to handle the conflict of interest issue is for 
the government to delegate oversight to individual 
universities. Each can then design policies best suited for 
its faculty and mission. 
It's a shame that the whole issue of disclosure and 
divestiture is based on the assumption that financial 
rewards affect a researcher's work. 
It is not proper to use graduate students to work on 
research a faculty member does for her firm. 
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(3:16) 
(3:17) 
(4) 
(4:1) 
(4:2) 
(4:3) 
(4:4) 
(4:5) 
(4:6) 
(4:7) 
(4:8) 
(4:9) 
There is nothing improper with companies paying for trips to 
scientific meetings and paying university scientists to talk 
at those meetings about topics related to the company's 
products. 
Faculty ought not to teach in areas where their commercial 
interests are direct and proprietary. 
The Social Relations of Intellectual Property 
The only "property rights" allowable for scientific 
discoveries are the scientific honors and rewards that 
derive from recognition of their originator. 
Some infringements of the university's principle of free 
dissemination of information should be allowed on a case by 
case basis in order to protect the university's financial 
interest. 
The unwillingness of academic researchers supported by 
industry to make research results public will slow the 
research process of colleagues. 
Modest changes in university rules regarding intellectual 
property will allow commercial activities to go forward 
without threatening traditional values. 
Science is nourished by free and open exchanges of 
information. There is no place for proprietary knowledge in 
the academy. 
Free and open exchanges in science that threaten industrial 
leadership are justifiably controlled. 
In expensive, large-scale university-corporate research 
partnerships, faculty should be required to sign 
confidentiality statements in which they agree not to 
disclose proprietary information. 
Given industry's heavy investment in some areas of 
university research, I see nothing wrong with submitting 
manuscripts to the company for review prior to submission to 
a j ournal. 
A few heavily endowed industrial projects can distort the 
values and mission of the university. Industrial projects 
bring with them a new kind of scientific culture that 
rewards marketable research and protects proprietary 
information. 
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(4:10) In order to protect worldwide commercialization rights for 
new technologies, its perfectly acceptable for universities 
to ask their scientists to delay publication of their 
research findings to allow time for patents to be filed. 
(4:15) While commercial interests sometimes stand in the way of 
full disclosure of scientific results, this impediment is 
more than compensated for by the infusion of additional 
funds which accelerates research and thus increases the 
amount of scientific knowledge. 
(5) Faculty EntreDreneurism 
(5:1) The norms of science abjure scientists from becoming 
directly involved in transforming their research results 
into objects of monetary value. Accordingly, academic 
scientists who market their research are defined as deviant. 
(5:4) Every university should be able to catalog the expertise of 
its members and then market those talents for fees or grants 
from corporations or other clientele. 
(5:5) The social structure of science changes dramatically after 
discoveries become inventions and researchers entrepreneurs. 
(5:7) If you make the ethics of academic science the same as Wall 
Street, you're going to corrupt science. 
(5:9) Two classes are being created within the academic 
profession: those who produce knowledge which can be made 
the basis of business enterprises, and those who do not. 
(5:11) There's nothing inappropriate for academic scientists, while 
holding regular academic appointments, to be proprietors, 
exclusively or jointly, in private business firms in which 
scientific knowledge gained in their academic capacity is to 
be used. 
(6) Faculty Reward Structure 
(6:2) It does not make any difference if the private sector 
replaces or complements government as the patron of science 
as long as the professional reward system of academe is 
preserved. 
(6:3) All professors should be obliged to develop revenue¬ 
generating projects as part of their responsibility. A 
professor's ability to generate funds should be one of the 
conditions of tenure. 
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(7) 
(7:1) 
(7:2) 
(7:4) 
(8) 
(8:3) 
(8:5) 
(9) 
(9:1) 
(9:3) 
(9:5) 
(9:7) 
(10) 
(10:2) 
The Design of Academic Work 
The legal safeguards built into large corporate-university 
contracts plus procedural limits established by the 
university are more than adequate to protect the 
institutional autonomy of the academic scientific community. 
With industrial support, there is relatively less freedom 
for the researcher because there is now a single line to 
follow, the line of the generous benefactor. 
Since industry rarely encourages fishing expeditions, the 
more industry funds research the less U.S. universities will 
nurture the capacity to innovate. 
The Academy as Community 
Market forces have always been a part of the shifts among 
posts in U.S. academia, but now the scale has dramatically 
altered their significance. These changes have created 
rifts within the faculties of each institution; the 
humanities and social science faculties often feel that they 
are being neglected. 
There are bound to be adverse consequences in terms of 
collaboration among faculty in various departments if one 
group must worry about protecting corporate rights to 
licenses. 
Quality Control (Peer Review) 
Too much weight is given to the role of peer-reviewed 
journals in the process of scientific communication. 
Science doesn't not exist until it is published. 
The peer review process is so slow and leaky is it any 
wonder that university officials might prefer to hold a 
press conference to announce the results of fast-breaking 
research? 
Given industry's investment in university research, it's not 
surprising that industry should want to extend its control 
into the "untouchable" area of peer review. 
Corporate sponsorship should be subject to peer review. 
The Organization of Academic Work (Department Structure) 
Policy concerning university-industry relations should be 
set and resolved at the department level. 
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(10:5) 
(ID 
(11:1) 
(11:2) 
University-industry relations are so demanding that they 
alter, in a substantive way, not only what it means to be an 
academic researcher, but also the balance of the curriculum 
offered by the university. 
Criteria for Faculty Recruitment and Advancement 
Where large investments are involved, companies should have 
the right to review faculty appointments. 
The availability of industrial funding encourages hiring in 
specific areas, which may not match education's long-term 
priorities. 
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Results of Forced Two-Factor Analysis 
Factor A 
Subj ects 
P2 
P9 
P4 
P12 
P5 
P17 
P6 
P10 
PI 
Pll 
P3 
P13 
P16 
P8 
P15 
P7 
P14 
H3 
H7 
Factor Loadings 
.742 
.732 
.728 
.726 
.691 
.689 
.680 
.657 
.618 
.608 
.608 
.604 
.596 
.593 
.539 
.510 
.457 
.432 
.300 
Factor B 
Subjects 
H12 
H14 
H4 
H5 
HI 
H6 
H9 
H10 
H2 
Hll 
H13 
H8 
Factor Loadings 
.887 
.832 
.783 
.778 
.776 
.772 
.741 
.661 
.650 
.633 
.566 
.482 
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Factor Demographics 
Selected Demographics for Factor A Historians 
Subject Factor Loading Gender 
H12 .867 F 
H14 .854 F 
HI .799 F 
H5 .791 F 
H4 .777 F 
H6 .768 M 
H9 .739 M 
H2 .636 M 
H10 .636 M 
Hll .592 M 
The average Factor A historian subject is 45 years of age and has 
13.4 years of teaching and research experience. Five factor A subjects 
are tenured. The striking aspect about Factor A in addition to its all 
historian cast is the relative location of female members. The top five 
loadings belong to women. Owing to their high factor loadings, female 
faculty exert the most influence in characterizing Factor A.1 
The mean age for subjects in the polymer subject factor is 51 
years. All but one subject is tenured and all are male. Teaching and 
research experience duplicates that of factor A - 13.4 years. Four 
faculty own patents and three have been (or are) members of corporate 
advisory panels. Over half (54%) of this group's work is supported by 
industry grants of various kinds. 
Residual Factors 
Residual factors in Q factor analysis often provide some 
suggestive leads for subsequent research. For example, factors C and E 
may merit closer inspection due to their age differential. Do they 
suggest a possible correlation between generation and gestalt (see Kuhn, 
1970; Mulkay, 1977; Richards, 1983; and Neustadt & May, 1986)? 
Factor C (Mean age *=66) 
Subj ect Factor Loading Age 
PI .720 64 
H7 .691 69 
P12 .652 65 
Factor E (Mean age *=36) 
Subj ect Factor Loading Age 
P2 .698 34 
Pll .670 32 
P3 .545 42 
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End Notes 
1. Factor weight is given as w - f/l-f, where f represents the factor 
loading and w the weight. Weight derives from a subject's factor 
loading which reflects the fact that some Q sorts are closer 
approximations of a factor than others. For example, the factor 
weight (w) for female subject H12 is .867/1-.867 or 3.47. 
Whereas, Hll's factor weight works out to be only 0.91. Hll's Q 
sort, in other words, carries only (.91/3.47) or 26 percent of the 
weight of H12's Q sort for calculating factor scores - the basis, 
remember, for defining factor A's composite opinion. (See Brown, 
1980, pps. 241-242, for details.) 
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